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LENDING DISCRIMINATION, THE 
FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND THE PERPETUATION 
OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE U.S. 
ALEATRA P. WILLIAMS* 
ABSTRACT 
For decades the agencies charged with minding the ‘fair credit and 
lending’ shop turned a blind eye to those (lenders) who pilfered minority 
homeownership (and consequently minority wealth) by extending mortgage 
lending products that were, in many cases, unequal to similarly situated 
non-minority counterparts. Since the 1950s, when the federal government 
endorsed homeownership policies for minorities, and the 1960s, when anti-
discriminatory lending laws were enacted, access to fair mortgage credit 
has been unattainable. Unbridled lending discrimination culminated in 
massive foreclosures for a disproportionate number of minority homeown-
ers during the Housing and Foreclosure Crisis. Lenders disparately fore-
closed upon upper class, middle class and lower class minority homeowners. 
The effect of these foreclosures widened homeownership gaps between whites 
and minorities. Foreclosures were more prevalent for minority homeowners 
regardless of economic class. Lending discrimination, and subsequent forfei-
ture of homes, undoubtedly altered the perception of the American Dream, 
and resulted in losses of generational wealth for minorities, furthered 
racial segregation and prolonged the stagnancy of the real estate market. 
Unquestionably then, lending discrimination is not a minority problem, but 
is an American problem. Therefore, agencies with jurisdiction to enforce 
lending and credit laws must, first, duly enforce these laws and, second, 
create civil or criminal mechanisms that effectively and finally eliminate 
unfair lending. 
                                                                                                                         
* Associate Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law; University of California, 
Berkeley (LL.M.), University of Oklahoma (J.D.), Purdue University (B.A.). My gratitude 
goes to my beloved father, Clarence Williams, for his unwavering support, love and above all, 
his example. I also wish to thank Adrienne Barry (Charleston 2014) for her dedication 
and assistance in researching this Article and instrumental help with early edits, and 
Rebecca Wolfe (Charleston 2016) for her amazing diligence and invaluable assistance 
with editing this Article. 
602 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:601 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 604 
I. HISTORICAL LENDING DISCRIMINATION ............................................... 607 
A. The Policy and Practice of Mortgage Discrimination ................... 607 
1. Redlining ..................................................................................... 607 
2. Reverse Redlining ....................................................................... 608 
3. Predatory Lending ...................................................................... 608 
B. All Things Being Equal Yet Unequal .............................................. 610 
II. LENDING DISCRIMINATION LAWS ....................................................... 611 
A. The Fair Housing Act ..................................................................... 611 
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ................................................. 613 
III. U.S. HOMEOWNERSHIP BY RACE AND ETHNICITY .............................. 614 
A. The Data ......................................................................................... 614 
1. Early–Mid 20th Century (1900–1970) ........................................ 614 
2. Late 20th Century (1980–1999) .................................................. 616 
3. Early 21st Century (2000–2005)................................................. 617 
4. The Great Recession (2006–2009) .............................................. 618 
5. Housing Market “Recovery” Period (2010–2013) ..................... 618 
IV. HOMEOWNERSHIP: A STEP TOWARD BRIDGING THE ECONOMIC 
WEALTH  GAP ...................................................................................... 621 
V. EFFORTS TO BRIDGE MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS .................... 623 
VI. FORECLOSURE NUMBERS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY .......................... 629 
VII. LENDING DISCRIMINATION DURING THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS ....... 630 
VIII. THE EFFECTS OF LENDING DISCRIMINATION ................................... 633 
A. Increased Disparities in Homeownership Rates ............................ 633 
B. Furtherance of Racial Segregation ................................................ 635 
C. Slower Climb out of the Housing and Economic Crises ................ 639 
D. Re-Defining the American Dream ................................................. 640 
IX. MECHANISMS TO ERADICATE LENDING DISCRIMINATION ................. 642 
A. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ........................................ 643 
1. Amendment to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B) .... 644 
2. Amendment to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act  
(Regulation C) ............................................................................. 645 
2015] LENDING DISCRIMINATION & HOMEOWNERSHIP 603 
3. Amendment to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X) ............................................................................. 647 
4. Amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (Ability-To-Repay Rule) 
(Regulation Z) .............................................................................. 648 
B. U.S. Department of Justice ............................................................. 654 
C. Federal Reserve Board .................................................................. 657 
D. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development .................... 657 
X. ANOTHER REMEDY: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND SANCTIONS.......... 658 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 659 
604 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:601 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Dream is dead—for some.1 The American Dream is that 
which brings forth a “better, richer and happier life.”2 According to Merriam 
Webster, the American Dream is defined as “an American social ideal that 
stresses egalitarianism” and “material prosperity.”3 It undoubtedly entails 
homeownership and denotes personal growth and progression into a brighter 
future.4 Although Thomas Jefferson hailed that “all men were created 
equal,”5 when it comes to the mortgage lending process, minority borrow-
ers are subjected to more systemic discrimination and pay higher prices than 
their counterparts.6 
Foreclosures have deferred homeownership dreams for millions of Amer-
icans.7 Because of the housing and foreclosure crisis, a disproportionate 
number of African Americans and Latinos lost their homes via mortgage 
foreclosure than any other racial group.8 These homeowners in particular 
have seen the American Dream slip right through their fingers and become 
unattainable for many more years to come, if at all. 
It is unfathomable that lending discrimination persists in the 21st cen-
tury. Despite the pharaonic efforts of the Civil Rights movement during the 
1960s and other political efforts to increase minority homeownership and 
eradicate discrimination, there is resounding evidence that supports that it 
does, indeed, rampantly persist. Discrimination based on race and ethnicity 
has become the stubborn stain that has proven difficult to remove. The recent 
                                                                                                                         
1 See, e.g., V. Dion Haynes, Peyton Craighill & Scott Clement, For More People, The 
American Dream Doesn’t Include a Home of Their Own, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/for-more-people-the-american-dream-doesn’t-in 
clude-a-home-of-their-own/2014/03/01/0c88002c-97e5-11e3-8461-8a24c7bf0653_story 
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C9KB-V3GH. 
2 JOHN TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214–15 (1931) (describing the 
American Dream as “that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and 
fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement”). 
3 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/american%20dream (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U2ZM-JFU6. 
4 Jon Meacham, Keeping the Dream Alive, TIME, Jun. 12, 2012, at 1, 3 (describing the 
American Dream as “steady personal and national progress”). 
5 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
6 See infra Part III. 
7 See generally Paul H. Ojeda, Albert Jacques & Paule C. Takash, The End of the 
American Dream for Blacks and Latinos, WCVI.ORG (June 2009), available at http:// 
perma.cc/CK4T-HQRG; Barbara Arnwine, Threat to American Dream of Home Owner-
ship Especially Devastating for Minority Communities, TRICEEDNEYWIRE.COM, http://perma 
.cc/GQN5-P53W. 
8 Alex Kellogg, Racial Gap in Homeownership Widens in U.S. Slump, NPR (Mar. 20, 
2014). 
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crisis revealed enduring systematic discrimination in mortgage lending, 
which had widely gone unchecked for many years. Even with multi-million 
dollar settlements with major lenders in recent years, the question remains 
whether the consequences were steep enough for the harms caused. 
Discrimination, especially on such a large scale, has many concomitant 
consequences. The ripple effects of methodical lending biases are greater 
wealth loss for minorities9 and widened gaps in home ownership in the U.S. 
between minorities and non-minorities.10 As the U.S. struggles to regain its 
bearing after the Great Recession, a greater recession is likely to endure 
for minorities.11 The foreclosure and housing crisis shows no sign of abat-
ing for many minorities, and the fallout will likely persist for a long time. 
Unfortunately, an unexpected consequence is that the symbolism of the 
American Dream encompassing homeownership is fading. Those who have 
experienced discrimination during the crisis are distrustful of, or worse, 
apathetic towards, the housing market.12 Without increased participation 
by minority groups, particularly African Americans, who as a group have 
some of the lowest rates of home ownership,13 the housing market will not 
improve to the greatest extent possible. Accordingly, if the housing market 
serves as a predictor of how the national economy will recover, then an 
underperforming housing market suggests that the national economy will 
likewise sluggishly recover. 
More than fifty years ago Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. urged this nation 
to dream of a place where “one day this nation will rise up and live out the 
true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal,’” and that all Americans “will one day live in a nation 
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content 
                                                                                                                         
9 Dorothy Brown, How Home Ownership Keeps Blacks Poorer than Whites, FORBES.COM 
(Dec. 10, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012 
/12/10/how-home-ownership-keeps-blacks-poorer-than-whites, archived at http://perma 
.cc/ZGS9-VG4N (stating that the housing crisis resulted in $198 billion loss in generational 
wealth in minority communities); Ingrid Beckles, Don’t Blame Minority Homeowners for 
the Housing Crisis, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://perma.cc 
/6BRS-2CTK. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra Part VIII. 
12 See, e.g., Haynes et al., supra note 1. 
13 African Americans are the lowest group of homeowners. They have a 2013 home-
ownership rate of approximately 43.1%. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Fourth Quarter 2013, 9 tbl.7 (Jan. 31, 
2014), available at http://perma.cc/G839-WBT7 [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS]. 
Caucasians have the largest homeownership rate of approximately 73.4%. Id. Latinos have a 
2013 homeownership rate of 46.1% while all other combined minorities (other than Latino 
and African American) have a homeownership rate of 55.1%. Id. 
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of their character.”14 With the advent of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau15 and other consumer protection advocacy groups born out of the 
foreclosure crisis, it is the hope that lending discrimination will, finally, be an 
abomination of the past. Lending discrimination not only hurts the bor-
rower—it has unintentional and pervasive consequences for the borrower’s 
community, city and nation. Thus, for the benefit of all, lending discrimina-
tion must be stamped out. 
This Article examines lending discrimination in the U.S. and the legal and 
social ramifications of such discrimination, mainly the widening gaps in 
economic wealth between racial and ethnic minorities and whites and the 
effect on the housing market, which, in turn, affects the national economy. 
The Article reviews historical aspects of lending discrimination in the U.S. 
from 1900 onward in Part I. Part II outlines the lending discrimination laws 
that provide guidance on the acceptable and unacceptable conduct before, 
during, and after the mortgage lending process. In Part III, the Article takes a 
critical look at foreclosure numbers by race and ethnicity during the housing 
market crisis. Part IV examines the role of homeownership in creating eco-
nomic parity. The gaps in homeownership rates based on race and ethnicity 
along with efforts to bridge these gaps are detailed in Part V. This Part also 
explores the effect of homeownership on economic wealth and how there 
has been a more drastic decline for minorities since 2005. The effect of fore-
closures against minorities is discussed in Part VI. Part VII links the number 
of foreclosures to lending discrimination during the housing and foreclo-
sure crisis. Part VIII exposes the patent and latent effects of lending discrimi-
nation from this recent crisis. In Part IX, the Article analyzes the legislative 
and regulatory reform efforts in light of the conclusive and prolific evi-
dence of recent lending discrimination. The possibility of using criminal 
sanctions as a remedy for lending discrimination is analyzed in Part X. 
Finally, the Article concludes that despite U.S. policies to increase minority 
homeownership (or because of them), the housing market and foreclosure 
debacle, fueled by lending discrimination, further exacerbated disparities in 
homeownership between Caucasians and minorities. In some cases, home-
ownership rates are worse than those that existed nearly twenty-five years 
ago. For these groups, the American Dream has become too elusive. Fur-
ther, lending discrimination has trajectorial effects on entire communities. 
In these communities, homeownership has become a lugubrious experience 
causing some to erase homeownership from the definition of the American 
                                                                                                                         
14 Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at the Lincoln Memorial, 
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript available at http://perma.cc/6YWH-5RYL). 
15 See infra Part IX.A. 
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Dream. Fair lending laws must consistently be enforced either civilly or crim-
inally so that lending discrimination is exterminated once and for all. 
I. HISTORICAL LENDING DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Policy and Practice of Mortgage Discrimination 
1. Redlining 
Before 1968, mortgagees could consider race as a factor when offering 
mortgages.16 In fact, the U.S. government openly endorsed considering racial 
factors when considering whether to insure mortgages under the Fair Housing 
Administration until the 1950s.17 In the first two-thirds of the 20th Century, 
if a borrower was a minority or lived in a minority neighborhood, his appli-
cation would likely be denied.18 Lenders believed that loans to these bor-
rowers or in these areas would create an unacceptable risk of default.19 The 
practice of blanket denial is known as redlining.20 
Sociologist John McKnight popularized the term “redlining” in the 
1960s.21 McKnight discussed the lender practice of literally marking red 
lines around areas where lenders would not be willing to make loans.22 The 
practice of redlining actually existed in the 1930s. Congress created the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation, a government sponsored corporation, as a part 
of the New Deal in response to President Franklin Roosevelt’s insistence 
that Congress enact legislation that “(1) protect[ed] the small home owner 
from foreclosure; (2) relieve[d] him of part ‘of the burden of excessive 
interest and principal payments incurred during the period of higher values 
and higher earning power’; and (3) declare[d] that it was a national policy 
to protect home ownership.”23 Redlining occurred when the Home Owners’ 
                                                                                                                         
16 Derek S. Hyra, Gregory D. Squires, Robert N. Renner, & David S. Kirk, Metropolitan 
Segregation and the Subprime Lending Crisis, 23 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 177, 180 (2013). 
17 FED. HOUSING ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL 978–980 (1938); see also CHRISTY 
ROGERS & JOHN A. POWELL, WHERE CREDIT IS DUE: BRINGING EQUITY TO CREDIT AND 
HOUSING AFTER THE MARKET MELTDOWN 144 (2013). 
18 Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 180. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (quoting Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: Consequential Subprime 
Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 107 (2006)). 
21 GARY GIROUX, BUSINESS SCANDALS, CORRUPTION, AND REFORM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
487 (2013). Redlining refers to the fact that African American areas were encoded in red 
so that lenders could avoid lending or limit lending to those areas. ROGERS & POWELL, 
supra note 17. 
22 ROGERS & POWELL, supra note 17. 
23 C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN COR-
PORATION 9 (1951), available at http://perma.cc/69ST-AQ2V. 
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Loan Corporation used color-coded maps to delineate areas to which it would 
lend.24 Thus, beginning in the 1930s, a national homeownership program 
became an implement of spatial exclusion and inequality which, at the same 
time, sustained and perpetuated homeownership disparity and economic 
inequality for minorities.25 
2. Reverse Redlining 
Reverse redlining occurs when a lender particularly targets minority 
consumers, charging them more than would be charged to a similarly situated 
non-minority consumer.26 Before the prohibition of such discrimination, 
the practice of redlining mostly affected African Americans in predomi-
nantly African American communities.27 The result of reverse redlining left 
the door open for other, often more predatory, lenders to service those areas 
excluded from the prime mortgage market.28 Predatory lenders distributed 
their products and further depressed minority communities, which created 
continuous cycles of poverty and debt, instead of cycles of wealth.29 Again, 
the ramifications of such practices are still being felt today, despite the 
mechanisms in place that prohibit such behaviors. 
3. Predatory Lending 
Predatory lending is broad and includes: 
a syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that involve one or more 
of the following five problems: (1) loans structured to result in seriously 
disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (2) harmful rent seeking; (3) loans 
involving fraud or deceptive practices; (4) other forms of lack of trans-
parency in loans that are not actionable as fraud; and (5) loans that re-
quire borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.30  
                                                                                                                         
24 Howell, supra note 20, at 107–08; see also UNDERWRITING MANUAL, supra note 17. 
25 See Kenneth T. Jackson, Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home 
Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, 6 J. URBAN HISTORY 
419, 430 (1980). 
26 Michael Powell, Bank Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 2009). 
27 Bill Dedman, The Color of Money, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 1, 1988; Barbara 
Ehrenreich & Dedrick Muhammad, The Recession’s Racial Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
2009. 
28 Gregory D. Squires, Predatory Lending: Redlining in Reverse, 139 SHELTERFORCE 
ONLINE (Jan./Feb. 2005), http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/139/redlining.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/D8GP-AT9M. 
29 Id. 
30 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002). 
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Predatory lending is typically comprised of one or more of the following 
actions: (1) interest rates significantly higher (the number of percentage 
points varies but usually falls within 5–8 percent) than Treasury securities 
of comparable maturities; (2) long prepayment penalty periods, especially 
those lasting three years or more; (3) balloon payments; (4) excessively high 
points or fees; (5) lending based on borrowers’ asset values rather than abili-
ties to repay; (6) frequent refinancing (“flipping”) without financial benefit 
for borrowers; (7) steering customers who qualify for lower-cost credit into 
higher-cost loans; (8) insufficient disclosure of the costs or risks associated 
with a loan; (9) inflated appraisals or income figures.31 
Mortgages are divided into two classes: prime and subprime.32 Subprime 
mortgages contain higher interest rates and fees.33 They are intended to open 
the door to homeownership for individuals with marginal creditworthiness.34 
Borrowers paid higher rates because the risks for default were considered 
much greater.35 With subprime mortgages, borrowers also pay higher upfront 
and continuing costs than borrowers with prime mortgages.36 As it was 
historically, a large majority of African American and Latino borrowers were 
the main recipients of subprime mortgages,37 showing an imbalance in mort-
gage lending markets. 
It was widely reported that subprime mortgages caused the housing mar-
ket bubble to burst.38 Many argued that, in an effort to fulfill a minority 
mortgage quota, lenders lowered their lending standards.39 These lower lend-
ing standards created higher cost mortgages that borrowers could not afford.40 
                                                                                                                         
31 Id. For a more complete list of predatory lending practices, see generally Patricia 
Sturdevant & William J. Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices, 
5 CONSUMER ADVOC. 36 (Nov./Dec. 1999). 
32 Rajdeep Sengupta & William R. Emmons, What is Subprime Lending?, FED. RES. 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS (2007), available at http://perma.cc/8YVA-TA7V. 
33 Id. 
34 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the 
Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 31 (Jan./Feb. 2006). 
35 Id. at 31–32 (stating that subprime mortgages are “simultaneously viewed as having 
great promise and great peril”). 
36 Id. at 32. Upfront costs are application, appraisal, and origination fees. Id. Con-
tinuing costs are mortgage insurance, principle, interest and late payments, and property 
taxes. Id. 
37 Gregory D. Squires, Derek S. Hyra & Robert N. Renner, Segregation and the Sub-
prime Lending Crisis, Presented at 2009 Federal Reserve System Community Affairs 
Research Conference, Washington, D.C., at 3 (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://perma 
.cc/D29W-ECVW. 
38 Thayer Watkins, The Nature and Origins of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, SAN 
JOSE ST. U. DEP’T. ECON., http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/subprime.htm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N42C-2QUS. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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Over time, lenders were originating these mortgages without regard to the 
affordability of the mortgages and passed the risk of these mortgages onto 
unsuspecting or irresponsible third party investors.41 
The above is only partially true. It is an accurate assessment that lend-
ers placed some borrowers into subprime mortgages when they should not 
have received these mortgages. However, the rationale behind this state-
ment is different than asserted. The reason that the borrowers should not 
have received subprime mortgages was not because they could not afford the 
mortgages, but because some of them were qualified for and should have 
received lower cost or prime mortgages.42 Although lenders during the 
foreclosure crisis did not actually draw red lines around minority neighbor-
hoods and forbid lending in certain areas, that is, reverse redlining, they 
effectively imagined such circles when determining fees and interest rates, 
which is just as reprehensible. Had these lenders not discriminated against 
certain borrowers, many of these borrowers likely could have afforded and 
kept their homes. The gamble of discriminating in loan originations came 
at a hefty cost for these borrowers. Furthermore, the economic consequences 
will likely be felt for generations. 
B. All Things Being Equal Yet Unequal 
More than forty years have elapsed since the enactment of the Fair 
Housing Act and many minorities are still under the scourge of lending dis-
crimination when purchasing a home.43 The disturbing fact is that federal 
agencies possessed knowledge that lenders engaged in lending discrimination 
before 2005 when lenders increased originations of subprime mortgages.44 
                                                                                                                         
41 Id. 
42 See infra Part VII. For example, Asst. U.S. Attorney General Thomas Perez, in his 
2012 report to Congress, highlighted a story of an eighty-year-old African-American resi-
dent in the Baltimore area. She had a 714 credit score and good credit file. However, she 
received a subprime loan and did not realize that she could have qualified for a prime loan. 
She did not realize that she had a subprime loan that came with an adjustable interest rate. 
She discovered she had a subprime loan only after her interest rate jumped two years later. 
THOMAS E. PEREZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2012 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/ecoareport 
2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7TYS-MUR6. 
43 See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Wen Li & Keith S. Ernst, Foreclosures by 
Race and Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Crisis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1, 
11 (June 18, 2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analy 
sis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8TU7-ESRS. 
44 Most of the offending subprime mortgages originated between 2005 and 2008. Id. 
at 7–8 (noting that an estimated 7.9% of African Americans and 7.7% of Latinos who 
purchased or refinanced their homes between 2005 and 2008 lost their homes by fore-
closure between 2007 and 2009). 
2015] LENDING DISCRIMINATION & HOMEOWNERSHIP 611 
In 2000, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
instituted several studies that researched whether minority communities, 
compared with other similarly situated non-minority communities, received a 
disproportionately larger share of subprime mortgages.45 HUD commis-
sioned studies in Atlanta, New York, Boston, and Baltimore.46 “[E]ven after 
controlling for the community’s income level, African American areas had a 
higher proportion of subprime loans. The evidence from these cities suggests 
lenders were inappropriately targeting minority neighborhoods or subprime 
lenders were serving areas that prime lenders neglected.”47 
In 2002, HUD conducted studies in Los Angeles and Chicago.48 Posing 
as prospective homebuyers, individuals with equal financial backgrounds 
sought information related to the mortgage lending process.49 The studies 
in Los Angeles and Chicago showed that the “posers” were treated equally 
most of the time, but when there was a disparity, the person of color was 
treated less fairly.50 While the laws that prohibit discrimination have been 
in place for over forty years, lending discrimination is still an issue. How-
ever, plaintiffs have had a difficult time substantiating lending discrimina-
tion in court. 
II. LENDING DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
Lending discrimination may occur at any phase in the mortgage lending 
process. The lending phases are: (1) advertisement and outreach by lending 
institutions;51 (2) responses to pre-application inquiry from prospective bor-
rowers;52 (3) approval or denial of loan applications;53 (4) determination of 
terms and conditions of mortgage loans;54 and (5) loan administration.55 
A. The Fair Housing Act 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act)56 prohibits 
lending discrimination. Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful to refuse to 
                                                                                                                         
45 Squires et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 7–8. 
48 MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL: A PAIRED TEST-
ING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITUTIONS (Apr. 2002), available at http://perma 
.cc/TW7J-9FBC. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (1968). 
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grant a residential mortgage loan or provide information regarding mort-
gage loans, impose different terms or conditions on a loan, discriminate in 
appraisals, refuse to purchase a loan, or set different terms or conditions 
for purchasing a loan based on an applicant’s race, color, national origin, 
religion, sex, familial status or disability.57 
As previously stated, it is generally believed that subprime lending was 
one of the major factors in creating the real estate market breakdown.58 
Racial minorities received different terms and higher fees, such as subprime 
or high cost mortgages, than similarly situated Caucasians. In 2006, an 
estimated 53.7% of African American and 46.6% of Latino recipients re-
ceived subprime mortgage loans, whereas only 17.7% of Caucasian mort-
gage recipients received subprime mortgage loans.59 Additionally, in areas 
where the borrowing community was at least 80% minority, approximately 
47% of borrowers had subprime mortgages according to census tracts.60 
On the other hand, in a predominantly Caucasian community, only 22% of 
borrowers had high cost mortgage loans.61 The data show dissimilarities 
based on which communities’ borrowers obtain high cost mortgages and 
which are more likely offered prime mortgages.62 Hence, there appears to 
be a stratified lending system in which the location of the borrower plays an 
important role in dictating mortgage terms. 
Both the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and HUD have the right to 
pursue discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act.63 An individual 
also has a private right of action under the Fair Housing Act; however, he 
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.64 To establish a prima 
facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had 
outwardly biased practices or policies that had a significantly adverse or 
disproportionate effect on members of a protected class when implemented.65 
Disparate treatment can be proved in many ways. A plaintiff can show 
overt evidence of disparate treatment, comparative evidence of disparate 
                                                                                                                         
57 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a)–(e) (2012). 
58 Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 177 (“Unsustainable high-cost lending was a major 
contributor to one of the worst financial crises in U.S. History.”). 
59 Squires et al., supra note 37, at 3. 
60 Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 178. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 187, 190. 
63 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING ACT ENFORCEMENT, http:// 
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/enforcement 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Q3RH-D9NP; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FAIR HOUSING ACT, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/housing_coverage.php 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GP7R-C6EU. 
64 See Tex. Dep’t of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–55 (1981). 
65 McCullough v. Town of Milan, No. 12–4574–CV., 2014 WL 1189868, at *2 (N.Y. 
2014). 
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treatment, or evidence of disparate impact.66 Overt lending discrimination 
is found when a plaintiff produces evidence that the lender explicitly dis-
criminated using the prohibited factors.67 This type of discrimination may 
exist even if the lender does not act upon the discrimination, but expresses 
a discriminatory preference.68 To establish a prima facie case of overt 
disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that the lender possessed animus 
against a particular protected group, which was a significant factor in the 
lender’s adverse decision.69 
Disparate treatment occurs when a lender treats a credit applicant differ-
ently on the basis of one of the prohibited factors. Showing that, beyond 
the difference in treatment, the treatment was motivated by prejudice or 
by conscious intention to discriminate against a person is not required. 
Different treatment is considered by courts to be intentional discrimina-
tion because the difference in treatment on a prohibited basis has no 
credible, nondiscriminatory explanation.70  
An example of disparate treatment is redlining because “a lender pro-
vides unequal access to credit, or unequal terms of credit, because of the race, 
color, national origin, or other prohibited characteristic(s) of the residents 
of the area in which the credit seeker resides ... or in which the residential 
property to be mortgaged is located.”71 
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
In addition to the Fair Housing Act, Congress enacted the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA).72 The ECOA was amended in 1976 and prohib-
its discrimination based on sex, national origin, race, color, religion, and age, 
                                                                                                                         
66 Id.; see also Munoz v. Int’l Home Capital Corp., No. C 03-01099, 2004 WL 
3086907, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co., 2007 WL 2437810, at 
*14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
67 FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL FAIR LENDING REGULATIONS AND STATUTES OVERVIEW, 
available at http://perma.cc/A4E9-DDK5. The Federal Reserve Board provided the fol-
lowing age discrimination example: “A lender offers a credit card with a limit of up to $750 
for applicants age 21–30 and $1,500 for applicants over 30.” Id. 
68 Id. Again, the Federal Reserve Board provided an example of expressly overt dis-
parate treatment. If a mortgage lender said, “[w]e do not like to make home mortgages to 
Native Americans, but the law says that we may not discriminate and we have to comply 
with the law.” Id. 
69 McCullough, 2014 WL 1189868, at *1. 
70 FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 67, at 2. 
71 Id. It is important to note that redlining violates both the Fair Housing Act and ECOA. 
72 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a)–(e) (1992). 
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inter alia.73 The ECOA bars discrimination based on the prohibited factors 
related to any feature of a transaction that involves the extension of credit, 
whether residential or commercial.74 
Under both the Fair Housing Act and the ECOA, a mortgage lender may 
not put off or redirect applicants upon inquiring about or applying for 
credit;75 alter an applicant’s terms of credit, such as the interest rate, type 
of loan, or amount of credit extended;76 use dissimilar criteria in determin-
ing to extend credit;77 use different standards in evaluating an applicant’s 
collateral;78 or treat a mortgagor disparately in relation to servicing a loan 
or pursuing default remedies.79 Furthermore, a mortgage lender may not 
verbally or in writing express a preference or “indicate that it will treat ap-
plicants differently” based on the prohibited factors.80 
In addition to the characteristics of the applicant, a mortgage lender 
may not discriminate in the extension of credit based on the characteristics 
of any “person associated with an applicant, prospective applicant, or bor-
rower (for example, a co-applicant, spouse, business partner, or live-in 
aide)”;81 or make a decision to discriminate based on the location of the 
neighborhood or area where the property to be financed is located.82 The 
prohibited actions are non-exhaustive and unlimited. A court may find evi-
dence of discrimination upon finding that the mortgage lender disparately 
treated applicants or borrowers based on any of the prohibited factors.83 
III. U.S. HOMEOWNERSHIP BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 
A. The Data 
1. Early–Mid 20th Century (1900–1970) 
For the past century, overall U.S. homeownership rates have errati-
cally jumped upwards and downwards. Prior to 1950, a great majority of 
                                                                                                                         
73 Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 
(1976). Other prohibited factors included marital status and consideration that any part of 
the applicant’s income was derived from public assistance. CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HAND-
BOOK, FAIR LENDING OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 2006), available at http://perma .cc/9X42-FHH6. 
74 CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, supra note 73. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Frederic S. Schwartz, The Fair Housing Act and ‘Discriminatory Effect’: A New 
Perspective, 11 NOVA L. REV. 71 (1987). 
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Americans rented their homes rather than purchased them.84 However, during 
the first forty years of the 20th Century, homeownership rates slightly in-
creased until the threat of war in 1940.85 By 1950, the homeownership rate 
had significantly increased to more than half of all Americans.86 The uptick 
in homeownership rates again grew in both 1960 and 1970 to 61.9% and 
62.9% respectively.87 
The total population and racial diversity also increased in the U.S. dur-
ing this period. Between 1900 and 1970, the U.S. population increased from 
76 million to 203.2 million.88 One out of eight Americans was of a race other 
than Caucasian in 1900.89 By comparison, in 2000, one out of four Ameri-
cans was a race other than Caucasian.90 
The data on homeownership by race and ethnicity is not readily avail-
able for the early 20th Century, especially for non-Caucasian and non-African 
American homeowners. However, less than 1% of the population in the early 
20th Century was a race other than Caucasian or African American.91 The 
available data also reveal that less than 20% of all African Americans owned 
their homes during this period.92 
By 1930, the number of African American homeowners had grown to 
28% compared to 43.6% nationally.93 In the 1930s, it was reported that 
more than two-thirds of African Americans earned less than the minimum 
income, $1,500 a year, to finance a home along with all other necessities.94 
However, the advent of African American Building & Loans somewhat 
helped to increase the number of African American homeowners.95 The gap 
                                                                                                                         
84 FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN 
THE 20TH CENTURY, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 115 (2002). The following is the 
percentage of homeownership rates by decade from 1900–1970: 46.5% in 1900, 45.9% in 
1910, 45.6% in 1920, 47.8% in 1930, 43.6% in 1940, 55% in 1950, 61.9% in 1960, and 
62.9% in 1970. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Historical Census of Housing Tables (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FQQ2-UFRS. 
85 Historical Census of Housing Tables, supra note 84. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 HOBBS & STOOPS, supra note 84, at 11. 
89 Id. at 76. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 David L. Moran, Homeownership is Colorblind: The Role of African American Savings 
and Loans in Home Finance, 1880–1980, 8 BUS. & ECON. HISTORY ON-LINE 2 (2010), 
available at http://perma.cc/3ZAV-746W. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. (referring to a 1931 federal study on homeownership). 
95 Id. at 3. 
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in homeownership rates between non-Hispanic Caucasians and African 
Americans based on the available data was roughly 20%.96 
The federal government created a few agencies that helped increase 
homeownership from 1934 through the 1970s. In 1934, Congress created the 
Federal Housing Administration,97 and the Veterans’ Administration  in 
1944.98 However, nationally sanctioned acts of discrimination and other 
policies of discrimination did not benefit minorities until the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, which prohibited discrimination based on race and ethnicity 
in the leasing and/or sale of real property.99 
2. Late 20th Century (1980–1999) 
The late 20th Century saw homeownership rate gains for all Americans. 
In 1980 the homeownership rate was 64.4%.100 In 1990 during the start of 
a recession until 1991,101 the national homeownership rate fell slightly to 
64.2%.102 In 1995, the rate improved to 64.7%.103 The 20th Century ended 
with 66.8% of Americans owning their homes.104 
Considering homeowners’ races or ethnicities, Caucasians had a home-
ownership rate of 70% between 1996 and 1999.105 African Americans had a 
homeownership rates right at 40%.106 Latinos’ homeownership rates from 
1996 improved almost 3% by 1999.107 Asians were the only minority group 
to have more than 50% homeownership rate between 1996 and 1999.108 
                                                                                                                         
96 Id. at 8. 
97 Robert M. Couch, The Great Recession’s Most Unfortunate Victim: Home-
ownership, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U. 11 (Nov. 1, 2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/TDX2-5H9S. 
98 Id. 
99 FAIR HOUSING ACT, supra note 56. Although the GI Bill of Rights protected 
servicemen from discrimination after World War II, federal or state laws offered no 
protections against discrimination to the general public. Moran, supra note 92. 
100 Historical Census of Housing Tables, supra note 84. 
101 ROBERT N. IRELAND, A NEW KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE GREAT RECESSION, 
NAT. BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (2010). 
102 Historical Census of Housing Tables, supra note 84. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. (stating the Caucasians’ homeownership rates from 1996–1999 was: 71.7% 
(1996), 72% (1997), 72.6% (1998) and 73.2% (1999)). 
106 See id. (reporting that African Americans’ homeownership rates from 1996–1999 
was: 44.1% (1996), 44.8% (1997), 45.6% (1998) and 46.3% (1999)). 
107 See id. (stating that Latinos’ homeownership rates from 1996–1999 was: 42.8% 
(1996), 43.3% (1997), 44.7% (1998), and 45.5% (1999)). 
108 See id. (reporting that Asians grouped with Pacific Islanders in the report had 
homeownership rates of: 50.8% (1996), 52.8% (1997), 52.6% (1998), and 53.1% (1999)). 
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The homeownership gaps between Caucasians and other minority groups 
were considerable. The gap between Caucasians’ and African Americans’ 
homeownership rates was approximately 27.2%.109 With Latinos, the dif-
ference in homeownership rates was around 28.3%.110 The gap between 
Caucasians and Asians was smaller at approximately 20.1%.111 
3. Early 21st Century (2000–2005) 
By 2000, more than two-thirds of Americans owned homes.112 The 
homeownership rate increased each following year until it reached its peak, 
69%, in 2004.113 After reaching historic heights, the real estate market crash 
resulted in a downward turn in homeownership across all racial groups be-
ginning in the last quarter of 2005.114 
Examining homeownership rates based on race and ethnicity, as ex-
pected, Caucasians continued to represent the largest group of homeowners. 
For Caucasians, their highest rate of homeownership, 76.2%, was in the 4th 
quarter of 2004.115 African Americans also achieved their highest rate of 
homeownership between 2000 and 2005. In the second quarter of 2004, 
African Americans’ homeownership rate reached a historic high of 49.7%.116 
During the fourth quarter of 2005, the peak homeownership rate for Lati-
nos was 50%.117 Asian Americans’ homeownership rate, the largest per-
centage of all minority homeowners, maxed out at 60.1% in 2006.118 
Comparing the highest level of ownership rates between Caucasians and 
minority groups, which these groups achieved before the real estate market 
decline in 2004 and 2005, one can still see a great disparity in homeowner-
ship rates. For African Americans, though, that gulf in homeownership 
rate was the largest at 26.5%.119 The difference in homeownership rates 
for Latinos and Caucasians was 26.2%.120 Asian Americans had the closest 
                                                                                                                         
109 See id. The average homeownership rate for Caucasians from 1996–1999 was 
72.4% while the average homeownership rate for African Americans was 45.2%. Id. 
110 See id. The average homeownership rate for Latinos from 1996–1999 was 44.1%. Id. 
111 See id. The average homeownership rate for Asians from 1996–1999 was 53.2%. Id. 
112 See id. Approximately 67.4% of Americans owned homes. Id. 
113 See id. The homeownership rates for 2001–2004 were 67.8% (2001), 67.9% 
(2002), 67.9% (2003), and 68.3% (2004). Id. 
114 See The State of the Nation’s Housing 2013, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD U., at 17 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/5XSL-KFPM. 
115 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
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homeownership rate to Caucasians, being within 16.1% of the Caucasian 
homeownership rate.121 Between 2000 and 2005, housing gaps between 
minorities and non-minorities were narrowing.122 However, the Great 
Recession would reverse these gains. 
4. The Great Recession (2006–2009) 
The number of homeowners precipitously fell consistently each year 
after 2006 by 1.2 million.123 In 2007, the total homeownership rate in the U.S. 
was 68.1%, a drop of nearly 1% since 2004.124 The homeownership rate 
dropped to 67.4% by 2009.125 
Reviewing the data available on ownership based on race and ethnicity, 
Caucasian homeownership rates dropped from 72.6% in 2006 to 71.4 % in 
2009.126 This represents an overall 1.2% decline in homeownership. African 
American homeownership rates dropped from 47.9% in 2006 to 46.2% in 
2009,127 a 1.7% plunge in homeownership. Latinos experienced a similar de-
crease from 49.7% in 2006 to 48.4% in 2009.128 This is a 1.3% decline. Like-
wise, Asians also witnessed declines in homeownership rates from 60.8%, 
a record high, to 59.3%, a 1.5% decrease.129 Comparatively, the group 
with the smallest percentage of homeownership, African Americans, had 
the greatest dive in homeownership rates. 
5. Housing Market “Recovery” Period (2010–2013) 
U.S. homeownership rates reached record lows between 2010 and 2013. 
In 2010, the American homeownership rate was 66.9%.130 The homeown-
ership rate dropped to 66.3% in 2011.131 Between 2011 and 2012, home-
ownership fell by 0.7% down to approximately 65.5%.132 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                         
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
123 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114. 
124 See id. at 36. 
125 See id. 
126 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13. The homeownership rates for 
Caucasians during 2006–2009 were: 72.6% (2006), 72% (2007), 71.7% (2008), and 
71.4% (2009). Id. 
127 See id. The 2006–2009 homeownership rates for African Americans were: 47.9% 
(2006), 47.2% (2007), 47.4% (2008), and 46.2% (2009). Id.  
128 See id. Latino 2006–2009 homeownership rates were: 49.7% (2006), 49.7% 
(2007), 49.1% (2008), and 48.4% (2009). Id. 
129 See id. The homeownership rates for Asians during 2006–2009 were: 60.8% 
(2006), 60% (2007), 59.5% (2008), and 59.3% (2009). Id. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 5. 
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housing market declined further during the first quarter of 2013 down to 
65%.133 The U.S. Census Bureau reported that the homeownership rate had 
plummeted to only 65.1% in 2013.134 Needless to say, the decline in home-
ownership evidences a slower climb out of the real estate market crisis 
than previously heralded.135 
Although there is an overall decline in homeownership, minority home-
ownership has dropped more substantially. Caucasian homeownership rates 
are at 73.5%, a decade low.136 Conversely, African American homeowner-
ship has declined to 43.9%, which is its lowest rate since 1995.137 Latino 
homeownership rates are 46%.138 
Amidst the narrative that the housing and mortgage market is rebound-
ing,139 homeownership rates remain depressed for all races140 approximately 
five years after the so-called end of the “housing and market crisis”.141 Com-
paring the homeownership data based on race and ethnicity from 2010 to 
2013, one can see a sizeable gulf in homeownership rates growing between 
certain minority groups and Caucasians.142 
The 2010–2013 homeownership rates for Caucasians were 74.5% in 
2010, 73.8% in 2011, 73.6% in 2012, and 73.4% in 2013.143 African Ameri-
can homeownership rates for the same time period were 45.4% in 2010, 
44.9% in 2011, 43.9% in 2012, and 43.1% in 2013.144 For Latinos, home-
ownership rates from 2010 to 2013 were 47.5% in 2010, 46.9% in 2011, 
46.1% in 2012, and 46% in 2013.145 
                                                                                                                         
133 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114. 
134 See Callis & Kresin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BULLETIN ON RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES 
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE FOURTH QUARTER 2013, Table 4SA (2013), available at http:// 
perma.cc/T398-MAXN. Homeownership rates for the U.S. have not been this low since 
1994 when the rate was 64%. See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 6. 
135 Christopher Matthews, After 8 Years, the Real Estate Market is Finally Looking 
Normal Again, FORTUNE.COM (Mar. 31, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/03/31/after-8 
-years-the-real-estate-market-is-finally-looking-normal-again/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/F9L4-TYHH (noting that an alignment between the supply and demand is a sign of a 
normal real estate market). 
136 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See Matthews, supra note 135. 
140 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9. 
141 Many argue that the housing crisis existed in the U.S. only from 2006–2009. If this is 
true, then it follows that the crisis is over and the real estate market’s recovery began in 2010. 
See Matthews, supra note 135. 
142 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
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The decline in homeownership numbers for minorities is particularly 
conspicuous in 2012. According to the Census Bureau’s Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement, only 44% of African Americans, 57% of Asians, and 
46% of Latinos owned their own homes, compared to 73% of Caucasians.146 
Homeownership gaps that had somewhat narrowed from the mid-1980s 
through the mid-2000s, widened again from 2007 onward, especially for 
African Americans.147 The Pew Research Center published a report that the 
gap between African Americans and Caucasians in 2012 is similar to the 
status quo of 1976.148 For Latinos, the Latino homeownership gap scantly 
narrowed with Caucasians in 2012.149 When compared with the 78% Cau-
casian homeownership rate, Asians had the narrowest homeownership gap.150 
Since experiencing peak homeownership rates in 2004 through 2012, Cauca-
sian homeownership rates fell only 2.7% while homeownership rates for 
African Americans and Latinos dropped by 5.8% and 3.3%, respectively.151 
The disparity in homeownership rates begs two questions: (1) what is the 
effect of these homeownership gaps; and (2) if differences in homeowner-
ship rates are revelatory, then what solutions are available to narrow the gaps? 
To answer both questions, one must first critically examine the pervasive 
problem of lending discrimination. Once it is determined that lending dis-
crimination exists, it is incumbent on relevant actors not to fall into the cap-
tious web of politics and policy statements, but to find concrete solutions 
that provide minorities with the ability to equitably retain or attain home-
ownership. The perpetuation of economic gaps between minorities and the 
majority engenders a policy of segregation152 and could ultimately prevent 
minorities from joining the middle class.153 The federal government has 
                                                                                                                         
146 See King’s Dream Remains an Elusive Goal; Many Americans See Racial Disparities, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 22, 2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013 
/08/22/kings-dream-remains-an-elusive-goal-many-americans-see-racial-disparities/4/#black 
-home, archived at http://perma.cc/EMY5-ZWU6. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. (noting that after 1976, the gap between African American and Caucasian 
homeownership rates fluctuated greatly as African American homeownership rose, only 
to return in 2012 to a nearly 40 year high). 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114, at 17. 
152 See Charles L. Nier, III, The Shadow of Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial 
Predatory Lending and Its Impact upon African American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. 
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 131 (2008) (quoting then-Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at 
the Constitution Center: A More Perfect Union (Mar. 8, 2008)). 
153 See Sen. Tom Harkin, Chairperson, Saving the American Dream: The Past, Present and 
Uncertain Future of America’s Middle Class (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.harkin.senate 
.gov/documents/pdf/4e5fa704f2533.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/63RT-AXHA (stating 
that “a strong middle class is the cornerstone of a strong America”). 
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taken bigger steps in establishing economic reform.154 However, a problem-
atic concern regarding these reformative efforts is that past efforts to bridge 
homeownership gaps have proven unsuccessful. Perhaps it is important to 
reexamine these ineffective efforts within the historical and current landscape 
of lending discrimination in the U.S. 
IV. HOMEOWNERSHIP: A STEP TOWARD BRIDGING THE 
ECONOMIC WEALTH GAP 
All racial or ethnic groups took a financial hit because of the housing 
industry meltdown. This is particularly devastating because a home is 
most Americans’ largest asset.155 When one owns a home, he is building his 
own personal net wealth.156 
For the most part, home losses, and thus personal net worth losses, 
were staggering for all races and ethnicities during the mortgage and fore-
closure crisis. The effects of lending discrimination magnified these losses 
for African Americans and Latinos. More African Americans and Latinos, 
who represent a smaller percentage of total homeowners, lost their homes 
or became upside down in their mortgages than any other racial groups dur-
ing the crisis as a result.157 
When comparing net worth along racial and ethnic lines, two things 
are evident. First, minorities have lower net worth than Caucasians gener-
ally. Pertaining to personal net worth, Caucasians’ average net worth at the 
height of the housing market, in 2005, was approximately $134,992.158 In 
2009, at the height of the foreclosure crisis, this group’s net worth fell 16%, 
down to $113,149.159 Comparatively, African Americans’ average net worth 
was only $12,124 in 2005.160 By 2009, however, this groups’ average net 
worth dwindled by 53% to $5,677.161 Similarly, Latinos’ median net worth 
                                                                                                                         
154 See infra Part IX. 
155 Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New Millennium—Transforming Poverty in 
America, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L . ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 391 (2002) (quoting Michael L. 
Daven & Patricia J. Fisher, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Household Net Worth & Asset Ownership 
1995 vii (Feb. 2000) and stating that “[f]or most Americans, the avenue to wealth 
creation—from generation to generation—is through the front door of their first home”). 
156 See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH & SOCIAL 
POLICY IN AMERICA 8 (1999); Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 34, at 31. 
157 See Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 3. 
158 See Rakesh Kochkar, Richard Fray & Paul Taylor, Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs 
Between Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jul. 26, 2011), http://www 
.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks 
-hispanics/, archived at http://perma.cc/YBE5-GETA. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
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dropped 66% from $18,359 in 2005 to $6,325 in 2009.162 In contrast, Asians’ 
average net worth was higher than Caucasians with a net worth of $168,103 
in 2005, but sharply declined by 54% to $78,066 in 2009, falling below the 
average Caucasian net worth.163 
Second, the importance of the home as an asset in a homeowners’ port-
folio is nonidentical for Caucasians and minority groups. To understand 
how the housing crisis translated into greater net worth losses for minority 
groups, one must understand the impact of homeownership on net worth 
for each group. According to a recent study, home equity represented 62% 
of the median African American owner’s net wealth and 67% of the median 
Latino owner’s net wealth.164 On the other hand, home equity represents only 
38% of the median Caucasian owner’s net worth.165 This study shows that 
homeownership is a critically significant asset in African American and 
Latinos’ financial portfolios. With a higher percentage of one’s net wealth 
being based on equity in a home, it follows that the loss of this asset more 
devastatingly decreases the overall net worth of these two minority 
groups. As a result of catastrophic home losses during the crisis, the 
wealth gap swelled between Caucasians and African Americans, Latinos, 
and Asians.166 
Besides taking one’s shelter, foreclosures have other wealth-depleting or 
limiting attributes. For instance, with a home, there is no equity to use for 
other wealth building ventures, such as using home equity as leverage for 
business or education loans, or having the ability to transfer wealth to the next 
generation at death. Similarly, foreclosure losses can depreciate home val-
ues to neighboring properties, leading to increased crime rates and com-
munity blight.167 
Of particular note is that most foreclosures were concentrated in predom-
inantly minority communities.168 It has been estimated that African American 
and Latino communities have suffered such economic losses in the amount 
of $94 billion and $177 billion, respectively, between 2009 and 2012.169 It 
was soon discovered that these losses were due to lending discrimination. 
                                                                                                                         
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114, at 14. 
165 See id. 
166 A source recently reported that, in 2010, the median net worth of Caucasians was 
as much as 7.9 times higher than African Americans and 8.2 times higher than Latinos. 
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114, at 14. 
167 See Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 11. 
168 Id. at 3 (stating that “the indirect losses in wealth that result from foreclosures as a 
result of depreciation to nearby properties will disproportionately impact communities of 
color.”). 
169 See id. at 3. 
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For these victims, agencies capable of enforcing the laws that were in place 
to prevent lending discrimination typically failed to enforce these laws or 
tacitly sanctioned such activities.170 Likewise, homeowners had little power 
to curb discriminatory lending because the high standards made claims 
difficult to prove.171 For these reasons, the American Dream of homeowner-
ship became a panoply of national policies with feckless pledges to tighten 
homeownership gaps between minorities and non-minorities. 
V. EFFORTS TO BRIDGE MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS 
It is generally accepted that 
the value of homeownership is deeply ingrained in American public 
culture. From early laws requiring landownership for the right to vote, 
to nineteenth-century homestead legislation, to contemporary real es-
tate brochures, the ownership of a home has long been presented as a 
crucial part of the ‘stake in society’ expected of full-fledged members 
of American communities.172 
In many ways, homeownership as an aspect of the American Dream is 
a byproduct of the federal government’s stated housing policies. Arguably, 
the United States has had a policy encouraging homeownership since 1913. 
The Revenue Act of 1913 allowed homeowners to deduct mortgage interest 
payments.173 Allowing mortgage interest deductions has been, and continues 
to be, touted as an incentive for or benefit of homeownership.174 
The ideal of homeownership as a part of the American Dream was 
adopted again after World War II. On July 15, 1949, President Harry S. 
Truman signed into law the Housing Act of 1949.175 In his statement, 
President Truman said:  
                                                                                                                         
170 See Richard Rothstein, A Comment on Bank of America/Countrywide’s Discriminatory 
Mortgage Lending and Its Implications for Racial Segregation, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
(2012), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp335-boa-countrywide-discriminatory 
-lending/, archived at http://perma.cc/5BNZ-XQGS (alleging that regulators entrusted to 
enforce lending discrimination laws “turned a blind eye, or worse,” for nearly a century). 
171 See infra Part IX. 
172 WILLIAM M. ROHE & HARRY L. WATSON, CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES IN AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP vii (2007). 
173 See REVENUE ACT OF 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913). 
174 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 711 
(1970). 
175 See Pres. Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President upon Signing the Housing Act 
of 1949 (Jul. 15, 1949), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?, archived at http://perma 
.cc/XK7R-U22Z. 
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[t]he Housing Act of 1949 ... establishes as a national objective the 
achievement as soon as feasible of a decent home and a suitable living 
environment for every American family, and sets forth the policies to 
be followed in advancing toward that goal. These policies are thoroughly 
consistent with American ideals and traditions.176 
The Housing Act of 1949 created the Direct Single Family Housing 
Loan and Grants program for qualified families.177 This Act did not provide 
housing for all Americans. Minorities were not included within the Ameri-
can housing acts until 1954.178 
In the 1950s, President Eisenhower’s Advisory Committee on Housing 
Policies and Programs issued a final report which noted that “too often, the 
opportunities of minority families to obtain adequate housing are extremely 
limited or non-existent. Too often, the workings of our free economy do 
not provide solutions that benefit minorities.”179 The advisory committee 
demanded that “changes in the attitudes of private investors”180 be “bolstered 
by vigorous administrative practice.”181 
President Eisenhower signed the Housing Act of 1954 into law on 
August 2, 1954. The Act focused on urban renewal.182 In his statement 
upon signing the Act into law, President Eisenhower said that the Act im-
proved upon the 1949 Housing Act by fortifying “private mortgage credit 
facilities” by “reorganizing the Federal National Mortgage Association.”183 
Furthermore, under the Act, “private financial institutions have a really 
good chance to mobilize their own resources to supply adequate mortgage 
credit ... to home owners in every part of our country.”184 
The principles of the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts were incorporated into 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.185 Included within the Fair Housing Act was 
the Federal Housing Administration’s Section 235 Home Owner Assistance 
                                                                                                                         
176 Id. 
177 See 7 C.F.R. § 3550.1-50.2 (2014). 
178 See B.T. McGraw, The Housing Act of 1954 and Implications for Minorities, 16 
PHYLON 171, 172 (1955), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/272718, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8EG2-WTJK (asserting that the Housing Act of 1954 now included a purpose 
to help minorities obtain mortgage credit through a regional committee under the Voluntary 
Home Mortgage Credit Extension Program). 
179 Id. at 176. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 68 Stat. 590 (1954). 
183 Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing the Housing 
Act of 1954, Aug. 2, 1954, 1954 Pub. Papers 675 (1954) available at http://www.presidency 
.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9962, archived at http://perma.cc/V824-NUU2. 
184 Id. 
185 See FAIR HOUSING ACT, supra note 56. 
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program.186 Under this program, the FHA subsidized loans for low-income 
families by offering mortgage insurance, which places the burden of a loan 
on HUD, and by lowering interest rates.187 HUD had a goal of “expanding 
homeownership and equal housing opportunities, and assuring reasonable 
shelter costs.”188 The program also required very low down payments.189 
Instead of expanding homeownership, this program was an epic fail and was 
ultimately discontinued in the 1970s.190 
Even though each of the preceding efforts was, in some way, well inten-
tioned with hopes of perpetuating the American Dream, the programs did 
very little to make homeownership a reality, particularly for minorities. 
Moreover, some private lenders who extended credit insured by the govern-
ment used these policies to make homeownership more difficult for minor-
ity groups. For example, hundreds of thousands of minorities faced steering, 
redlining, and other forms of discrimination when attempting to utilize 
these programs.191 
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)192 to 
combat redlining and discrimination.193 The CRA guidelines required finan-
cial institutions “to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in 
which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound opinion of such 
institution.”194 The CRA’s purpose was to increase competition in neglected 
minority and low-income communities. Implicit within the mandate was to 
eliminate discrimination and cultivate a non-discriminatory system for credit, 
                                                                                                                         
186 See HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 235, 82 
Stat. 476, 476-85, repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 401(d), 101 Stat. 1898, 1899 (1988). 
187 See id. 
188 Sylvia C. Martinez, The Housing Act of 1949: Its Place in the Realization of the 
American Dream of Homeownership, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 467, 469 (2000). 
189 See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing 
Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1312 
(1995) (revealing that some home owners were required to produce down payments as 
low as $200 and interest rates were reduced as low as 1%). 
190 See id. Some of the problems included “blockbusting” whereby realtors would cause 
consternation by “warning” owners in majority Caucasian neighborhoods of the dangers 
of the neighborhood becoming entirely black. A large majority of the owners, if not all of 
them, sold their homes, which resulted in “white flight.” See id. Similarly, FHA appraisers 
were bribed to actively participate in fraud by overlooking severe structural defects. Id. 
By 1979, 18% of Section 235 homes were either in foreclosure or assigned to HUD. See 
id. Therefore, instead of expanding homeownership to the underserved, the Home Owners 
Assistance program appears to have exacerbated the problem. 
191 See id. at 1317–18. 
192 See COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT OF 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-125, tit. VIII, 91 Stat. 
1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–09 (2012)). 
193 See Schill & Wachter, supra note 189, at 1318. 
194 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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including home mortgages.195 The Federal Reserve Board and other federal 
agencies routinely conduct assessments of CRA institutions.196 Part of the 
evaluation considers whether evidence of lending discrimination or other 
unlawful credit practices exists.197 
President William J. Clinton announced his administration’s “National 
Homeownership Strategy” (NHS) on November 5, 1994.198 President Clin-
ton’s desire, in collaboration with various governmental and private indus-
try actors,199 was to expand homeownership by 8 million new homeowners 
between 1995 and 2000, up to a 67.5% homeownership rate.200 The NHS 
involved 100 detailed actions201 that combined “private and public sector 
resources and commitments to implement three broad approaches designed to 
make homeownership more affordable, accessible, and available.”202 
Some of the noteworthy Actions were: 
x Action 29: Alternative Approaches to Homebuyer Transac-
tions.203 
                                                                                                                         
195 Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 
1301 (2014) (stating that reforms, like CRA, were created to “oblige banks to foster economic 
equality and to refrain from discrimination against customers or neighborhoods. These 
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196 See Community Reinvestment Act, FED. RESERVE BD., http://www.federalreserve 
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http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51448, archived at http://perma.cc/BB3R-9HD5. 
199 See THE NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP STRATEGY: PARTNERS IN THE AMERICAN 
DREAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 1-1 (May 1995). “Partners in the American 
Dream” of the NHS included, in part: the American Bankers Association, American Land 
Title Association, Fannie Mae, Federal Home Loan Bank System, Freddie Mac, Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America, National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, National Association of Realtors, National Bankers Association, National Council of 
La Raz, National Urban League, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. See id. 
200 See id. at 1-1. 
201 See id. at 1-1 to 1-10. 
202 Id. at 1-2. 
203 Id. at 1-7. 
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x Action 35: Home Mortgage Loan to Value Flexibility.204 
x Action 36: Subsidies to Reduce Down Payment and Mortgage 
Costs.205 
x Action 37: IRAs & 401(k)s for Homeownership Down Pay-
ments.206 
x Action 39: Mortgage Options and Homebuyer Education.207 
x Action 44: Flexible Mortgage Underwriting Criteria.208 
x Action 45: Public-Private Leveraging for Affordable Home 
Financing.209 
x Action 58: Federal & State Resources for Affordable Home-
ownership.210 
x Action 71: Access to Mortgage Lending Data.211 
x Action 72: Research on Fair Lending & Insurance Issues.212 
The NHS would be declared a success by 1996 due to an almost 1% 
increase in the national homeownership rate from 64.2% in 1994 to 65.1% 
in 1995.213 However, many believe that such easy access to mortgages set 
the stage for the real estate market crash.214 Additionally, the number of sub-
prime mortgage originations exponentially increased during the tenure of 
the NHS, from $35 billion in 1994 to $140 billion in 2000.215 Moreover, 
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FRBSF Economic Letter, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. 1 (Dec. 28, 2001), available at 
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the share of subprime mortgages in the total mortgage market swelled from 
5% in 1994 to 13.4% in 2000.216 
President George W. Bush’s administration embraced a national home-
ownership policy called the “Ownership Society.”217 Through the Owner-
ship Society, President Bush pledged to have “more people owning their 
own home” because it is “[a] national interest that more people own their 
own home.”218 In 2004, the national homeownership rate reached its peak 
rate of 69.2%.219 President Bush wanted to use this policy to increase the 
number of minority homeowners by 5.5 million by 2010.220 Although home-
ownership rates increased for minorities through 2006, minority rates started 
to decline in 2007.221 
The data show that African American homeownership rates were 2% 
lower, at around 43%, in 2013 than they were in 1990, at 45.2%, despite 
these national homeownership policy incentives.222 The government and 
private industry created a system in which fair access to mortgage credit was 
a mirage that lenders utilized to victimize minorities and lower classes. 
The U.S. spent billions of dollars on these housing programs while banks 
made trillions of dollars in order to “fulfill the call” of these programs.223 
However, arguably, these programs created a system of widespread deception 
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217 Expanding Home Ownership, Pres. George W. Bush’s Record of Achievement, 
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773976. Banks and thrifts have earned an estimated $955.5 billion in profits between 
2004 and 2014. Id. This, despite, deficits in 4th quarter of 2008 and 1st, 2nd and 4th quar-
ters in 2009.  In addition to these profits, banks have received billions in federal govern-
ment bailouts. See Bailed Out Banks, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/news/spe 
cials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc 
/G5KA-KSWT. Taken together, the clear winners during the housing and foreclosure crisis, 
and continuing, are banks and thrifts.   
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and fraud perpetrated by predatory wolves dressed in sheep’s clothing 
(lenders), which the government tolerated, or tacitly authorized by inaction, 
until the mortgage lending system effectively drove countless minorities 
out of the mortgage market completely. As a result, those affected by the 
foreclosure crisis will likely refashion the definition of the American Dream 
to exclude homeownership entirely. 
VI. FORECLOSURE NUMBERS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 
Foreclosure has adversely marked millions of Americans. During 2007 
and 2009, lenders foreclosed on an estimated 2.5 million mortgages.224 The 
data very clearly demonstrate that African American and Latino homeowners 
were disproportionately affected by foreclosures in relation to their share 
of mortgage originations.225 Of the loans originated between 2005 and 
2008, an estimated 8% of both African Americans and Latinos have lost 
their homes to foreclosures, while only 4.5% of whites lost their homes.226 
Non-Hispanic whites represented approximately 56% of families fore-
closed upon between 2007 and 2009.227 On the other hand, 11.6% of Afri-
can American and 16.2% of Latino families were foreclosed upon during this 
same time.228 Although more non-Hispanic whites lost their homes through 
foreclosure than any other racial group, the impact of loss is much greater for 
African Americans and Latinos, whose estimated proportion of mortgage 
originations were 7.8% and 11.2%, respectively.229 The Center for Respon-
sible Lending estimated that African Americans lost 240,020 homes and 
Latinos lost 335,950 homes between 2007 and 2009.230 
Interestingly, the suspicion that most of the foreclosure disparities 
would be concentrated in lower income classes was disproven by the data 
examined by the Center for Responsible Lending.231 The data show similar 
levels of foreclosure rate disparities on all income levels—low, moderate, 
middle, and high. For instance, non-Hispanic Caucasians had an approxi-
mated 74.1%, African Americans possessed about 14.8%, and Latinos ac-
counted for around 11% of the low-income mortgage originations between 
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2005 and 2008.232 The percentages of completed low-income foreclosures 
from 2007 to 2009 were as follows: non-Hispanic whites accounted for 
67.1% of the foreclosures, African Americans made up 21%, and Latinos 
accounted for 11.9%.233 
The data further revealed that the African American share of mortgage 
origination rates declined at the middle and high-income levels.234 In con-
trast, non-Hispanic Caucasians and Latinos mortgage origination slightly 
increased.235 Unexpectedly, however, the rates of completed foreclosure indi-
cated higher disparity ratios. Regarding the middle-income level, the com-
pleted foreclosures between 2007 and 2009 were: 66.5% for non-Hispanic 
whites, 14.5% for African Americans, and 13.2% for Latinos.236 On the high-
income level, the completed foreclosures from 2007 to 2009 were: 67.3% for 
non-Hispanic whites, 9.9% for African Americans, and 22.8% for Latinos.237 
VII. LENDING DISCRIMINATION DURING THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
During the housing market meltdown, foreclosure actions uncovered 
discriminatory practices by lenders.238 There is evidence that certain lend-
ers methodically targeted certain minority groups, causing these borrowers 
to pay more for loans not because of their credit scores, but because of their 
national origin, ethnicity, or race.239 Other reprehensible conduct by lenders 
during the real estate market depression included steering minorities into 
subprime mortgages240 and refusing to lend in minority communities, in other 
words, redlining.241 
After many years of lax enforcement, city, state, and the federal gov-
ernment finally took action to enforce lending discrimination laws. In re-
sponse to the increasing number of fair lending discrimination cases, the 
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DOJ created the Fair Lending Unit within the Civil Rights Division’s Hous-
ing and Civil Enforcement Section in 2010.242 In its first two years, the 
Fair Lending Unit filed and/or resolved sixteen lending matters, which was an 
increase in the average of around two cases per year from 1993 to 2008.243 
In 2011, the Fair Lending Unit filed eight lawsuits based on lending re-
lated matters and procured eight settlements, totaling about $350 million.244 
The largest lending discrimination settlement was with Countrywide Finan-
cial Corporation.245 In United States v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, 
Countrywide Home Loans and Countrywide Bank,246 the Fair Lending Unit 
alleged that Countrywide Financial (Countrywide) engaged in systemic acts 
of discrimination based on race, national origin, and marital status in residen-
tial mortgage lending in violation of the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit 
Opportunity Acts.247 In its complaint, the government alleged that Country-
wide’s home mortgage lending policies permitted it to target Hispanic and 
African American mortgagors by placing them in subprime mortgages, and 
by charging higher loan fees and costs.248 It is alleged that there were over 
200,000 victims of Countrywide’s discriminatory lending practices.249 On 
December 28, 2011, the court issued a consent order that settled the law-
suit for $335 million.250 As a part of the agreement, should Countrywide 
decide to enter into the mortgage lending market, the Fair Lending Unit 
must review its lending practices and policies.251 
Another complaint was filed in United States v. C & F Mortgage Cor-
poration on September 30, 2011.252 In its complaint, the government alleged 
violations of both the Fair Housing Act and ECOA.253 African American and 
Hispanic mortgagors were charged higher interest rates and given lesser 
discounts than their similarly situated Caucasian counterparts, resulting in 
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a disparate impact on these protected groups.254 This lawsuit was settled. 
C & F was required to pay its victims $140,000, develop policies regarding 
its lending policies, stay on alert for future racial disparities, and provide 
adequate training for its employees.255 
The Eastern District of Missouri entered an agreed order in United 
States v. Midwest BankCentre on June 28, 2011.256 In this case, the govern-
ment contended that Midwest BankCentre (Midwest) disparately provided 
mortgage lending services to borrowers in predominantly African American 
neighborhoods than to those in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods, 
in other words, redlining.257 Because of the agreed order, Midwest agreed 
to operate a full-service branch in an African American neighborhood and 
invest in the African American areas it redlined.258 
Additionally, the DOJ settled a lawsuit with Wells Fargo for $175 million 
in 2012.259 The DOJ’s chief complaint was that Wells Fargo, through its 
mortgage brokers, charged higher fees and rates to more than 30,000 minority 
borrowers compared to white borrowers who posed identical credit risks from 
2004 to 2009.260 Likewise, the DOJ alleged that Wells Fargo encouraged at 
least 4,000 minority borrowers into subprime mortgages while white bor-
rowers with similar credit risks were given regular mortgage loans.261 
In 2013, the City of Los Angeles filed two lawsuits against Citicorp 
and Wells Fargo, alleging lending discrimination and predatory lending 
practices.262 The City of Los Angeles alleges that both Citicorp and Wells 
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Fargo engaged in redlining and predatory lending practices that resulted in 
disproportionate numbers of foreclosures in minority neighborhoods, loss 
of $481 million in tax revenues for the City, and an estimated $1.2 billion 
in maintenance costs on foreclosed homes.263 The City later filed a similar 
lawsuit against Bank of America.264 
These cases were a first step in battling mortgage discrimination. How-
ever, the effects of lending discrimination cannot be undone. Actively 
targeting minority borrowers or pushing minority borrowers into subprime 
mortgages when they qualify for prime mortgages is, unquestionably, lending 
discrimination. Arguably, the effect of the subprime mortgage crisis was felt 
on every economic level: locally, nationally, and internationally.265 How-
ever, the fallout of disparate placement in subprime mortgages is on African 
Americans and Latinos. Such treatment has far reaching effects and will 
undoubtedly perpetuate problems with the real estate market for many years 
to come. 
VIII. THE EFFECTS OF LENDING DISCRIMINATION 
A. Increased Disparities in Homeownership Rates 
Involuntary loss of homeownership, especially by foreclosure, is likely 
both emotionally and financially devastating to any homeowner. Personally, a 
homeowner sustains loss of his or her equity and severe damage to his or 
her credit rating,266 and possibly loss of family and community. 
One of the most disturbing characteristics of the foreclosure crisis is 
that a large majority of its burdens were unevenly borne by African Amer-
icans and Latinos because of lending discrimination. The many victims of 
lending discrimination continue to suffer through the consequences of 
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delinquency or foreclosure without adequate resolution. For example, dispar-
ate treatment by lenders caused many of these homeowners to have lower 
credit scores as a result of delinquencies and foreclosure.267 With lower credit 
scores and tightened credit-lending standards,268 these victims will be re-
victimized because of a difficult and steep climb to homeownership in the 
future. Consequently, lenders are more likely to deny minority and lower-
income applicants for conventional loans269 and the cycle of subprime financ-
ing will begin anew with more minorities composing the largest percentage 
of subprime mortgages. 
One of the lessons learned from the crisis is that high cost and sub-
prime mortgages to minorities correlated to the loss of homeownership by 
foreclosure. There was a higher incidence of foreclosure of subprime mort-
gages held by minorities from 2007 through 2009.270 These losses may con-
tinue in the future. According to one report, a disproportionate number of 
African Americans, Asians, and Latinos are not yet out of the woods in the 
foreclosure crisis.271 Therefore, the economic consequences of lending dis-
crimination are not yet fully known and an autopsy of the housing and fore-
closure crisis is premature. 
Moreover, and particularly distressing, there is statistical evidence that 
African Americans are less likely to become homeowners again once home-
ownership is terminated.272 Some explanations behind this failure to return 
to homeownership include a combination of ability (stricter credit stan-
dards bar a return) and desire (the homeowner simply does not want home-
ownership). Regardless of the reasons, home loans to African Americans 
dropped 80% from 1.3 million in 2005 to 280,000 in 2011.273 Likewise, Lati-
nos had a 76% decline in mortgage loans from 1.9 million in 2005 to just 
442,000 in 2011.274 Hence, an important and large segment of the popula-
tion is not participating in the housing market. 
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In a speech before the Detroit Economic Club on February 8, 1954, 
Albert M. Cole, Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, 
stated:  
It is very poor business to ignore one-tenth of our population as a hous-
ing market. It is worse than bad business. We are simply not living up 
to the standards of a free economic and a democratic society. For the 
housing economy has not been a free economy for the Negro.275 
Unfortunately, this statement is still relevant for minorities approximately 
sixty years later. There were 44.5 million African Americans, alone or in 
combination with one or more races, in the United States on July 1, 2012.276 
The projected African American population in the United States, either 
alone or in combination with other races, for July 1, 2060 is 77.4 million.277 
Therefore, barriers to homeownership, such as lending discrimination, 
must be eradicated so that the housing market thrives economically, and more 
importantly, so that it serves the needs of all segments of the population. 
B. Furtherance of Racial Segregation 
One of the concomitant, latent effects of inequitable lending is the fur-
therance of racial segregation278 and lack of economic diversity.279 One of 
the first pieces of legislation that recognized racial economic parity was 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (CRA 1866).280 The CRA 1866 gave all citi-
zens, regardless of race, color, or past servitude, the same rights to purchase, 
hold, or convey real or personal property, among other things, as white 
citizens possessed.281 Although minority citizens were given the same rights 
to property as white citizens, there was no mention of where minority 
citizens could hold or purchase the property. Therefore, the ingrained belief 
that minorities were second-class citizens fashioned a system of segrega-
tion following the CRA 1866. 
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After tacitly adopting a “separate, but equal” philosophy,282 the federal 
government became content with its policy or acceptance of racially segre-
gated society. The 1930’s Fair Housing Administration’s underwriting 
guidelines openly embraced the “separate, but equal” principle that “racial ho-
mogeneity was essential for stability and desirability of residential areas.”283 
State Jim Crow laws kept racial and ethnic citizens separate from white 
citizens in housing, jobs, and schools.284 Consequently, a pattern of racial 
segregation emerged in most areas of the U.S.285 
It became the norm for residential communities to include restrictive 
covenants in deeds that typically limited homeowners and their successors 
from selling their residences to African Americans, Asians, Jews, or Lati-
nos.286 In Shelley v. Kraemer, home buyers challenged a restrictive covenant 
that precluded sales to African Americans.287 The Shelley Court made such 
covenants unenforceable.288 Even though explicit restrictive covenants were 
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void, Shelley did very little for the socially accepted and implicit segregation 
covenants that existed. 
Two landmark Supreme Court cases attempted to challenge the culture of 
racial segregation. The plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas289 challenged the accepted “separate, but equal” idea in education 
as espoused in the Plessy case.290 Similarly, in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,291 
the Court held that the CRA 1866 prohibited even private sellers from dis-
criminating against persons of color in home sales.292 
Although the challenges to segregation, along with other civil rights legis-
lation,293 were successful in deregulating segregation, the United States’ 
culture of racial segregation lingered. When minorities moved into “for-
bidden” areas in the past, white families quickly moved out, in what has been 
termed “white flight.”294 In short time, these areas became mainly minority 
areas.295 The data show that many cities where white flight occurred re-
mained highly segregated in the 21st Century.296 In part, this isolation con-
tributed to the mortgage and foreclosure crisis. Access to fair lending was 
not readily available in minority communities.297 Many seeking a home loan 
either could not receive a loan or received a high cost loan.298 
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Although many have speculated about or opined on the roots of the real 
estate market/mortgage meltdown,299 many have ignored “the role of struc-
tural and contextual forces, most notably various trajectories in inequality, 
uneven metropolitan development, and racial segregation.”300 Predominantly 
heterogeneous minority neighborhoods were the hardest hit by the foreclo-
sure crisis.301 “Given that segregation concentrates the effects of any eco-
nomic downturn spatially ... the rise in foreclosures hit black and Hispanic 
neighborhoods with particular force.”302 
Generally, foreclosure affects a consumer’s mobility and, of course, his or 
her financial security.303 Segregation is furthered because the victims of the 
crisis most likely need to live with family members, who often live in minor-
ity concentrated areas, to get their financial bearings.304 In areas in which 
high numbers of foreclosures occurred, neighbors are also affected.305 Home 
values decrease greatly.306 As home values decrease, equity is lost. Because 
minorities’ net worth is closely tied to home equity,307 they are less able to 
purchase outside of segregated areas. Consequently, the areas will likely re-
main depressed and, thus, predominantly minority.308 
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Segregation is harmful to everyone for several reasons. First, those 
who are marginalized have an uphill climb in receiving academic and 
occupational opportunities.309 Second, because poverty is more prevalent 
in segregated predominantly-minority areas, crime is also more likely to 
increase. According one scholar, “[l]ong-term racial and social isolation in 
neighborhoods with high percentages of single parent families also leads 
to the formation of gangs and other forms of ‘oppositional culture’ and a 
form of linguistic isolation, which limits employment opportunities later in 
life.”310 Third, members of society remain ignorant of each other’s back-
grounds and experiences, making it difficult to have a democratic political 
system that accurately represents the melting pot of America. Finally, the 
economy cannot be carried by one segment of the population. Segregated 
minority communities are generally impoverished. Like segregation, pov-
erty becomes a generational condition.311 As a result, economic stability 
becomes hard to maintain. 
C. Slower Climb out of the Housing and Economic Crises 
Although the Great Recession officially ended in 2009,312 there is 
plenty of evidence that the recession will continue for many years. Elizabeth 
Duke of the Federal Reserve Board acknowledged that “[t]he economy 
normally has some self-correcting mechanisms ...”,313 which typically cur-
tail a continued downward spiral of a housing market crisis. However, 
Duke further noted that none of the self-correcting mechanisms have worked 
in this recent crisis.314 
Perhaps the self-correcting mechanisms, such as a drop in home prices 
to increase the supply and demand,315 are unsuccessful because they do not 
exactly get to the root of the cause of the crisis. Many are discounting the 
fact that Caucasians, who have a high percentage of ownership with 73.4% in 
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the 4th quarter of 2013,316 have better access to the American Dream. On 
the other hand, minorities, particularly African Americans and Latinos, have 
been pushed out of the housing market by the meltdown.317 Furthermore, it 
is estimated that minority populations will continue to grow and “will consti-
tute 7 out of 10 net new household formations over the next decade.”318 
Therefore, the biggest gains in homeownership demands are in minority 
communities.319 Failing to open the doors for homeownership to these groups 
will only serve to prolong the housing crisis.320 
Hopefully, these opportunities will soon take shape to avoid this type of 
economic crisis in the future. It is important to learn from past mistakes so 
that we do not repeat them. The first step is to provide access to fair lending. 
The goal, of course, should include: (1) implementation of policies that 
reinforce homeownership for new minority homeowners; and (2) create 
methods that entice would-be “boomerang” minority homeowners of all 
communities back into the real estate market after foreclosure. 
D. Re-Defining the American Dream 
The American Dream has been a part of the fabric of the United States’ 
national identity for nearly a century.321 It is aspirational. The American 
Dream typically includes the right and expectation to get married, have a 
family, and buy a home.322 It involves the dogged determination that one can 
accomplish any set goal.323 Even those on the lower rungs of the economic 
ladder could dream of upward mobility by pulling themselves up by their 
bootstraps.324 
This latest downturn possibly tarnished the American Dream more than 
any event in history. If it is true that the future generation learns from its pre-
ceding generation, then the future generation of minorities will likely be-
lieve that the American Dream has become too elusive. Thus, to these 
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future Americans, the American Dream will remain just that—a dream—or 
even a myth. 
United States housing policies were supposed to make the American 
Dream more attainable for those with limited economic opportunities. One 
could argue that housing policies have worked to lift lower income Cauca-
sians firmly into the middle class since the 1930s.325 However, housing 
policies have done very little to elevate minorities.326 Moreover, the fore-
closure and housing crisis has altered the definition of the American Dream. 
Instead of being vehicles for advancement, U.S. housing policies became 
means by which lenders pilfered the American Dream from some Ameri-
cans who have historically struggled and who continue to fight for basic civil 
rights. As John Truslow Adams wrote in 1931, “[e]quality of outcome ... 
is not the same thing as equality of opportunity, and equality of opportunity 
is at the heart of the American vision.”327 
Although the laws are clear as to what constitutes discrimination, fed-
eral agencies failed to “mind the store” so that these laws could be enforced. 
Prior to 2010, enforcement duties shared by numerous regulating agencies 
were a bureaucratic nightmare.328 With so many “cooks in the kitchen,” 
things were likely to get burned. Unfortunately, it was largely certain groups 
of borrowers that were “burned” by lending discrimination. Even though 
there were complaints of discriminatory practices or policies before 2009, 
the agencies were slow to act or failed to act completely. It was reported that 
the OCC brought four formal actions under the ECOA between 1987 and 
July 2009, and made no referrals to the DOJ.329 The Office of Thrift Super-
vision did not make any referrals to the DOJ during this same period.330 
Things changed when the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act was signed into law.331 The question remains whether Dodd-
Frank and the subsequent regulations and actions are enough to prevent 
another crisis and lending discrimination in the future. 
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IX. MECHANISMS TO ERADICATE LENDING DISCRIMINATION 
President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act into law on July 21, 2010.332 Title XIV of Dodd-Frank, 
the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, modified the Truth-
in-Lending Act (TILA)333 “by setting forth prudent lending standards, con-
sumer protections for both prime and subprime (high cost) mortgages, 
mortgage servicing guidelines, appraisal requirements, and loan modification 
/work-out procedures.”334 
Historically, four major federal regulators and agencies oversaw mort-
gage lending and consumer protection.335 First, the U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Development’s (HUD) mission was, and is, to “create strong, 
sustainable, inclusive communities” and reinforce “the housing market to 
bolster the economy and protect consumers.”336 HUD’s Office of Housing 
oversees the Fair Housing Administration.337 Second, the Federal Reserve 
Board’s (FRB) responsibilities included regulation of “banking institutions 
to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and financial sys-
tems to protect the credit rights of consumers.”338 One of the FRB’s ex-
pressed functions included administration of nationwide banking and credit 
policies.339 Third, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) de-
clared mission encompassed examination and supervision of financial 
institutions for safety, soundness, and consumer protection.340 Finally, the 
Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulated and supervised all 
national banks and federal savings associations.341 The OCC’s goal involved 
ensuring that the banks and the savings associations it regulated operated 
“in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with laws requiring fair treat-
ment of their customers and fair access to credit and financial products.”342 
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In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act343 created the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau (CFPB) to draft rules, and supervise and enforce federal 
consumer protection laws.344 There are still collective enforcement duties 
among the regulatory agencies, but creation of the CFPB streamlined en-
forcement of ECOA and FHA by theoretically cutting out some of the bu-
reaucratic red tape that naturally existed between regulators with overlapping 
responsibilities.345 Although many heralded the arrival of the CFPB, critics 
complained that the CFPB’s power was both unfettered and undefined.346 
A. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
The CFPB has several functions. The CFPB is imbued with the authority 
to create, supervise, and enforce regulations concerning consumer financial 
services and products.347 Among other things, the CFPB is empowered to 
draft regulations that prohibit “unfair lending practices that promote dis-
parities among consumers of equal credit worthiness but of different race, 
ethnicity, gender, or age.”348 
Additionally, the CFPB has the power to file civil actions to enforce the 
ECOA on its own or refer fair lending abuses to the U.S. Attorney General.349 
The Office of Administrative Adjudication (OAA), which is “an independent 
judicial office,” is housed “within the [CFPB].”350 The OAA hears enforce-
ment actions brought by the CFPB.351 The OAA’s administrative judges 
                                                                                                                         
343 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 STAT. 2136 (2010). 
344 Williams, supra note 328, at 475. 
345 See The Economist, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Blessing or Bureau-
cracy, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 6, 2012, 7:57 PM), available at http://perma.cc/377J-XJDN; 
Ammon Simon, Bureaucracy Unbound? The Consumer Protection Finance Bureau, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Mar. 7, 2012, 4:35 PM), available at http://perma.cc/W34W 
-G5AA (stating that the “CFPB lacks any significant checks and balances on its power to 
interpret our country’s consumer-protection laws” and calling for reformation of the agency 
so that its biased enforcement of consumer protection laws does not stifle economic 
growth). Id. 
346 The Economist, supra note 345. 
347 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(e)(1)–(2) (2012). 
348 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(3)(C) (2012). The CFPB must confer with the applicable 
prudential regulator or agency before proposing a rule or regulation. Id. § 1002 (24). Pru-
dential regulators or agencies include the FDIC, OCC, FRB, and National Credit Union 
Administration. Id. 
349 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (2012). 
350Administrative Adjudication, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumer 
finance.gov/adminstrativeadjudication (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma 
.cc/PF54-6UMG. 
351 Id. 
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follow the Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings,352 and publish 
notices on the CFPB website to provide procedural guidance.353 The CFPB 
pursued five actions in 2012, thirteen actions in 2013, and fifteen actions as 
of October 2014 for its 2014 docket.354 
Since its creation, the CFPB has tackled the enforcement of four major 
residential mortgage laws. The CFPB has amended the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act,355 Home Disclosure Mortgage Act (HMDA),356 Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),357 and Truth in Lending Act.358 
Five of the enforcement actions brought by the CFPB as of July 2014 were 
related to section 8 of RESPA.359 
1. Amendment to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B) 
Title 15 U.S.C. § 1691b authorizes the CFPB to impose regulations that 
facilitate compliance and aid in carrying out the purposes of the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act.360 Such action by the CFPB could include any adjustments 
it deems appropriate and necessary to prevent the circumvention or eva-
sion of the ECOA, as well as to facilitate compliance with the ECOA.361 
Effective for applicants on or after January 18, 2014, the CFPB prescribed 
                                                                                                                         
352 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,058 (June 29, 2012). 
353 See Administrative Adjudication, supra note 350. 
354 Id. 
355 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)–(f) (1992). 
356 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810 (2012). 
357 Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601-617 (2012); Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act, 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (2012). 
358 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2012). 
359 See, e.g., Paul Taylor et al., 2013 C.F.P.B. 0001 (2013), available at http://perma 
.cc/9G38-9RHU (resulting in a consent order with disgorgement of over $118,000); 
Fidelity Mortg. Corp. and Mark Figert, 2014 CFPB 0001 (2014), available at http:// 
perma.cc/6EGJ-2A24 (resulting in $54,000 civil monetary penalty to the Civil Penalty 
Fund); PHH Corp. et al., 2014 C.F.P.B. 0002 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/8MR9 
-CAKA (seeking a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of § 8 of RESPA, 
disgorgement of money, restitution to borrowers, civil penalties, and prosecution costs); 
1st Alliance Lending, LLC, 2014 CFPB 0003 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/H7ED 
-BFLP (parties agreeing to a consent order of $83,000 civil monetary penalty payable to the 
Civil Penalty Fund); JRHBW Realty, Inc., 2014 CFPB 0005 (2014), available at http:// 
perma.cc/TS4Q-6VJ9 (resulting in consent order with $500,000 civil penalty to the Civil 
Penalty Fund); Stonebridge Title Serv., Inc., 2014 CFPB 0006 (2014), available at http:// 
perma.cc/7RH-7M9Z ($30,000 civil monetary penalty to the Civil Penalty Fund). The 
above represent the enforcement actions filed before the OAA only. The CFPB filed other 
actions in the Southern District Court of Florida as well. See, e.g., infra note 383. 
360 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2013). 
361 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (2013). 
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the “Disclosure and Delivery Requirements for Copies of Appraisals and 
Other Written Valuations under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regula-
tion B),”362 known as the “ECOA Valuations Rule.” 
Under the ECOA Valuations Rule, creditors must comply with two main 
requirements. First, creditors must disclose to applicants that they have the 
right to receive copies of appraisals and all written valuations within three 
business days.363 Second, the new rule mandates that creditors automatically 
send free copies of home appraisal and written valuations to prospective bor-
rowers as soon as such appraisals or valuations are finished.364 Creditors 
must send the appraisal copies even if they decided not to extend credit or if 
the applicant does not fully complete the credit application process or other-
wise withdraws his or her credit application.365 
The former Regulation B only compelled creditors to notify applicants 
of their right to request a copy of appraisals and to provide copies of ap-
praisals upon request by the applicant.366 The new Regulation B is broader 
in scope than the former because it applies to all written valuations and not 
only appraisals per the old rule. 
The purpose of the ECOA is to bar discrimination based on prohibited 
factors.367 As stated earlier, discrimination can arise at any stage in the home 
purchase process.368 There is clear evidence that inflated or deflated home 
appraisals played a significant role in the housing and foreclosure melt-
down.369 It is apparent that the CFPB is concerned with appraisers or valu-
ators who use prohibited discriminatory factors in assessing the value of a 
residence in connection with an application for credit. Thus, the CFPB is fur-
ther working to curtail discrimination at this stage in the lending process. 
2. Amendment to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (Regulation C) 
Mortgage lenders in metropolitan areas are required to “collect, report, 
and disclose data about mortgage loan applications, originations, and pur-
chases”370 for new home loans, refinances, or home improvement loans 
                                                                                                                         
362 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 1002.14 (2014). 
363 Id. 
364 Id. 
365 Id. 
366 Id. The amendments to Regulation B are available at http://perma.cc/TD3D-75S7. 
367 See supra Part II.B. 
368 See supra Part II.B. 
369 Kenneth R. Harney, Inflated Appraisals Swelling Mortgage-Fraud Schemes, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 21, 2007, available at http://perma.cc/ULA8-LN7V. 
370 12 U.S.C. §§ 2803(h) (2012). 
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under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)371 and Regulation C.372 
Among other things, the data disclosed must include information related to 
the type of home loan, amount of the loan, location of the property, and the 
race, ethnicity, income, and sex of the applicant.373 HMDA data collection 
is used to alert enforcement agencies of “possible discriminatory lending 
patterns and assist in the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.”374 It 
also aids enforcement agencies in assessing whether the financial institu-
tions satisfy the housing needs of particular communities they service.375 
The CFPB implemented new rules related to the data collected from 2014 
onward.376 The agency modified the definition of “[f]inancial institution” 
under Section 1003.2 to raise the asset-size exemption threshold to $43 mil-
lion from $42 million, effective January 1, 2014.377 Therefore, this amend-
ment exempts all “financial institutions” with assets under $43 million from 
HMDA data collection for 2014.378 
The CFPB recently sent an unequivocal message to all lending institu-
tions covered under the HMDA of the importance of accurately reporting 
the required data. For instance, the CFPB took action against Mortgage 
Master, Inc.379 and Washington Federal380 for inaccurately providing in-
formation under the HMDA. The CFPB required Mortgage Master, Inc. to 
pay $425,000 in civil penalties.381 Washington Federal had to pay $34,000 
in civil penalties.382 The CFPB’s Director Richard Cordray reaffirmed the 
importance of the data received under the HMDA. He said, “[w]hen finan-
cial institutions report inaccurate information, it obstructs the purpose of 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and makes it more difficult for the CFPB 
                                                                                                                         
371 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (Regulation C), 12 C.F.R. § 1003 (2013). 
372 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–810 (2012); see also Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation 
C): Adjustment to Asset-Size Exemption Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,285 (Dec. 30, 2013) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
373 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(2) (2012); see also Stephanie Caputo, The ABC’s of HMDA, 
HMDA DATA AND LENDING OPPORTUNITIES (Summer 2005), available at http://perma 
.cc/HWJ9-JYM7. 
374 Caputo, supra note 373. 
375 Id. 
376 Id. 
377 12 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2012). 
378 Id. 
379 Mortgage Master, Inc., 2013 C.F.P.B. 0006 (2013), available at http://perma 
.cc/PM9Z-U87B. 
380 Washington Federal, 2013 C.F.P.B. 0005 (2013), available at http://perma 
.cc/G3BG-BKYP. 
381 Mortgage Master, Inc., 2013 C.F.P.B., at 0006.  
382 Washington Federal, 2013 C.F.P.B., at 0005. 
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to discover and stop discriminatory lending.”383 Cordray continued that the 
Mortgage Master, Inc. and Washington Federal actions should serve as “a 
strong signal that no lending institution—whether bank or nonbank—should 
be able to mislead the public with erroneous data.”384 
3. Amendment to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X) 
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)385 protects con-
sumers by requiring lenders, mortgage servicers, or brokers to disclose 
mortgage settlement costs and barring certain uses of escrow accounts and 
kickbacks.386 In 2010, Dodd-Frank transformed RESPA and other mort-
gage servicing procedures. The CFPB made both technical and substantive 
modifications to Regulation X, effective January 10, 2014.387 These amend-
ments included notice requirements regarding servicing transfers and added 
notice measures pertaining to borrowers’ error resolution services and re-
quests for information.388 Other new provisions included “escrow payments, 
force-placed insurance, general servicing policies, procedures, and require-
ments, early intervention, continuity of contact, and loss mitigation.”389 
Kickbacks unnecessarily increased costs of mortgagors for mortgagors dur-
ing the foreclosure crisis.390 The CFPB has taken steps to eradicate kick-
backs by pursuing enforcement actions against lenders, mortgage brokers, 
and mortgage servicers.391 
                                                                                                                         
383 CFPB Takes Action Against Nonbank & Bank for Inaccurate Mortgage Loan 
Reporting, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc 
/GE2W-N29E. 
384 Id. 
385 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2012). 
386 FED. RESERVE BD., Regulation X: Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, CONSUMER 
COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (Nov. 2013), available at http://perma.cc/5XZ2-946K. 
387 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1024 (2012). 
388 Id. 
389 Consumer Affairs Letter, Regulation X: Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 
FED. RESERVE BD., available at http://perma.cc/NNH6-NBD9. 
390 Kenneth R. Harney, Alleged Kickbacks Paid by Home Buyers Get Attention from 
Federal Agency, WASH. POST, May 31, 2013, available at http://perma.cc/AN2J-WUV9. 
391 See Administrative Adjudication, supra note 350. See also Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. Genworth Mortg. Ins. Corp., 1:13 cv 21183 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (consent order result-
ing in $4.5 million in civil penalty); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Mortg. Guaranty Ins. 
Corp., 1:13 cv 21187 (S.D. Fla. 2013) ($2,650,000 civil penalty); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 
v. Radian Guaranty Inc., 1:13 cv 21188 (S.D. Fla. 2013) ($3,750,000 civil penalty); Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. United Guaranty Corp., 1:13 cv 21189 (S.D. Fla. 2013) ($4,500,000 
civil penalty). 
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4. Amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (Ability-To-Repay Rule) 
(Regulation Z) 
One of the most significant rules by the CFPB is the amendment of 
Regulation Z,392 which took effect on January 10, 2014.393 The “Ability-
to-Repay Rule” implements the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and sections 
1411–1412, 1414 of Dodd-Frank.394 This rule is designed to right the wrongs 
of the recent mortgage crisis.395 The Ability-to-Repay Rule expands the 
2008 revisions of Regulation Z by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).396 
The FRB’s rule prohibited lending higher-priced loans to borrowers without 
consideration of the consumer’s ability to repay the debt.397 In addition to 
expanding the FRB’s rule, the CFPB amendment of Regulation Z creates 
and clarifies standards for Dodd-Frank’s new class of mortgages, “Qualified 
Mortgages” (QMs).398 
The FRB’s revision only set forth standards for higher-priced mort-
gages, not prime mortgages.399 Higher-priced mortgages were defined as:  
Consumer-purpose, closed-end loans secured by a consumer’s principal 
dwelling and having an annual percentage rate (APR) that exceeds the 
average prime offer rates for a comparable transaction published by the 
Board by at least 1.5 percentage points for first-lien loans, or 3.5 per-
centage points for subordinate lien loans.400  
The FRB set up four requirements for lenders related to these loans. First, 
lenders were compelled to take into account a consumer’s ability to repay 
                                                                                                                         
392 Ability-to-Repay & Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6,408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) 
[hereinafter Ability-to-Repay]. 
393 Mortgage Rules, What the New CFPB Mortgage Rules Mean for Families and 
Homeowners, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, available at http://perma.cc/5FW9-GVKC. 
394 Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6,408. 
395 Id. (noting that a large number of mortgages were made without considering bor-
rowers’ ability to repay and/or through loose underwriting standards). One of Dodd-Frank’s 
objectives was to standardize loan products. The hope was that consumer protection 
would be the byproduct of this standardization. See Tanya D. Marsh, Statement Before 
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: Regulatory Burdens: The 
Impact of Dodd Frank on Community Banking (July 18, 2013), available at http://perma 
.cc/UC6Q-S3AM. 
396 Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (2008). 
397 Id. 
398 Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6,408. 
399 Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), supra note 396, at 44,522. 
400 Id. at 44,522–23. 
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from sources other than collateral.401 Second, prepayment penalties were not 
allowed except under certain circumstances.402 Third, creditors were required 
to verify borrowers’ income and assets.403 Fourth, creditors were required 
to set up escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, which could be canceled 
one year after the loan was consummated.404 
Under Dodd-Frank, QMs are mortgages underwritten to match specific 
federal law standards; they indicate that a creditor has taken into account 
reasonable underwriting factors in the extension of credit.405 The CFPB’s 
amendments set forth minimum underwriting standards with which a lender 
must comply. The following are the eight factors that a lender must take 
into account:  
(1) Current or reasonably expected income or assets; (2) current em-
ployment status; (3) the monthly payment on the covered transaction; 
(4) the monthly payment on any simultaneous loan; (5) the monthly 
payment for mortgage-related obligations; (6) current debt obligations, 
alimony, and child support; (7) the monthly debt-to-income ratio or re-
sidual income; and (8) credit history.406  
To further ensure responsible underwriting, the revision requires lenders 
to “generally use reasonably reliable third-party records to verify the in-
formation they use to evaluate the factors.”407 
Each mortgagor must have the ability to repay the mortgage, which 
means that the borrower must have a debt to income ratio of 43% or less.408 
The QM standard requires that a lender compute a borrower’s monthly pay-
ments “based on the highest payment that will apply in the first five years 
of the loan” in addition to debt to income ratio requirement.409 In addition, 
lenders cannot charge high points or fees. For example, for a loan of 
$100,000, a lender cannot charge points or fees greater than 3%.410 Addi-
tionally, mortgagees are prohibited from steering borrowers into higher cost 
mortgages.411 Further, the loan cannot have features that are deemed “risky”, 
                                                                                                                         
401 Id. at 44,523. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. 
404 Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), supra note 396, at 44,523. 
405 Lisa Prevost, “Qualified” Loans, Redefined, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2013, at RE10. 
406 Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6408. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. at 6409 
409 Id. 
410 Id.; see also CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, MORTGAGE RULES: WHAT 
THE NEW CFPB MORTGAGE RULES MEAN FOR FAMILIES AND HOMEOWNERS, available at 
http://perma.cc/9X42-FHH6. 
411 Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6432. 
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such as negative amortization, interest only, stated-income loans, or loans 
lasting longer than thirty years.412 
The CFPB clarifies that a safe harbor exists for a lender. If a lender 
satisfies the criteria for QMs and the loan is not a higher-priced loan as de-
fined by the FRB 2008 modification, then there is a conclusive presump-
tion that the lender made a reasonable determination of the borrower’s 
ability to repay and acted in good faith.413 This provides lenders with safe 
harbors against liability from consumers.414 
Regarding subprime or higher-priced loans, a rebuttable presumption 
against liability may be created if a lender satisfies the QM criteria.415 How-
ever, a borrower may have present grounds for rebutting the presumption.416 
To rebut the presumption, or show a violation regarding the subprime QM, a 
borrower can present evidence that “at the time the loan was originated, the 
[borrower’s] income and debt obligations left insufficient residual income or 
assets to meet living expenses.”417 On review, the appropriate entity would 
take into account the borrower’s “monthly payments on the loan, loan-related 
obligations, and any simultaneous loans of which the creditor was aware, as 
well as any recurring, material living expenses of which the creditor was 
aware.”418 The longer amount of time that a borrower has made timely pay-
ments without modification or accommodation, the less likely a borrower 
may rebut the presumption.419 
It appears that the CFPB fully understands that these modifications 
may make lenders apprehensive to extend credit. The CFPB has stated, “[i]n 
light of the fragile state of the mortgage market as a result of the recent mort-
gage crisis, however, the Bureau is concerned that creditors may initially be 
reluctant to make loans that are not qualified mortgages, even though they 
are responsibly underwritten.”420 To allow lenders to somewhat temporarily 
bypass the standards, the CFPB created a second category of QMs. To be a 
QM, a lender must either: (1) satisfy the QM standards; or (2) meet the under-
writing standards, making it eligible to be purchased, guaranteed, or insured 
by either: (a) Government Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae, or Freddie 
Mac, while they were under federal conservatorship (or issue their own 
underwriting standards); or (b) HUD, Veterans Affairs, Department of 
                                                                                                                         
412 Id. at 6409. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. 
415 Id. at 6408. 
416 Id. at 6408–09. 
417 Id. at 6409. 
418 Id. 
419 Id. 
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Agriculture, or Rural Housing Service.421 This second category of QMs 
will only be available for seven years.422 
A borrower has three years after an alleged violation to pursue a legal 
action against a lender.423 Successful plaintiffs are entitled to damages up 
to all paid finance charges and fees, plus other actual damages, costs, and 
attorney’s fees.424 Performing a prohibited act would serve as a defense 
against foreclosure if the act constitutes a breach of the Ability-to-Repay 
requirement.425 
Some authors have expressed concerns that the Ability-to-Repay standard 
is too stringent and will keep the credit market restrictive in its lending.426 
Of particular concern is the requirement that borrowers must have a debt to 
income ratio no greater than 43%, irrespective of credit score, to be deemed a 
“qualified mortgage.”427 Debts taken into account in calculating the debt to 
income ratio are property taxes, student loans, and points or fees associated 
with the home sale.428 It has also been argued that the amended rules “shifted 
accountability for loans from borrowers to lenders.”429 
It has yet to be seen whether the Ability-to-Repay Rule will cause 
more harm than good. The real estate market is still struggling to survive 
and is currently on life support.430 Tightened credit may prolong the need 
for life support or cause the whole system to crash. 
The rule could possibly injure both homebuyers and some creditors.431 
Prospective homebuyers may be harmed if they have student loans. The 
Ability-to-Repay Rule now includes student loan debt in the calculation of 
                                                                                                                         
421 Id.  
422 Id. 
423 Id. at 6422; see also Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(affirming that mere notice is sufficient and that a borrower must file suit within three 
years to invoke the rescission provision of Regulation Z). 
424 Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6416. 
425 Id. 
426 See, e.g., Richard Satran, Fewer Easy Mortgages Under U.S. Consumer Agency Rule, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 20, 2013. 
427 Id. (reporting that some mortgagors might be able to afford a mortgage with an even 
higher household debt ratio). 
428 Id. 
429 Diane Katz, Dodd-Frank Mortgage Rules Unleash Predatory Regulators, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013 
/12/doddfrank-mortgage-rules-unleash-predatory-regulators#_ftn21, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/75AV-KJCX. 
430 Satran, supra note 426. 
431 Id.; Katz, supra note 429. 
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debt ratio.432 Additionally, verification of employment history might be prob-
lematic as a result of the crisis.433 Further, homeowners might be unable to 
refinance their homes if their household debt is more than 43% of their 
income.434 Also, potential homebuyers in high-priced real estate markets, 
like California, would have difficulty qualifying for a home loan.435 The 
overall concern is access to affordable housing. 
The new rule might be more burdensome for minorities, specifically, 
in three ways. First, as discussed previously, African American and Latino 
groups generally do not have economic parity in terms of personal net 
worth.436 Consequently, African Americans and Latinos graduate with more 
student loan debt compared to Caucasian bachelor degree holders.437 One 
report stated that 40% of Latinos, and 51% of African Americans, borrowed 
money for college, compared to 43% of Caucasians.438 The estimation is that 
“27 percent of black bachelor’s degree holders had more than $30,500 in 
loans, compared with 16 percent of white bachelor’s degree holders.”439 
Moreover, “81 percent of non-Hispanic black students and 67 percent of 
Hispanic students left school with higher debt compared to non-Hispanic 
white classmates.”440 Second, the new Ability-to-Repay Rule may make it 
difficult for minorities, particularly African Americans and Latinos, to incur 
student loan debt for any degree level and attain homeownership in the future. 
The rule may force minorities to select which part of the American Dream 
                                                                                                                         
432 Student loan debt was historically excluded from the income–debt ratio, but the 
Ability-to-Repay Rule modified the ability to repay formula to include this debt. Satran, 
supra note 426. 
433 Id.  
434 Id. 
435 Id. 
436 Rakesh Kochkar, Richard Fray, & Paul Taylor, Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs 
Between Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jul. 26, 2011), http://www 
.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks 
-hispanics/, archived at http://perma.cc/T77E-QVB8. 
437 Equal Justice Works, How Student Debts Affects Women, Minorities, THE STUDENT 
LOAN RANGER (May 1, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student 
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perma.cc/6HMP-L5TP; Minority Students Are Saddled School Loan Debt, THE NATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/education 
/minority-students-are-saddled-by-school-loan-debt-20130130, archived at http://perma.cc 
/9FYP-JLTQ. 
438 Isaac Juarez, Minority Students Have More Student Loan Debt, LOANS.ORG 
(Nov. 2, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://loans.org/student/news/minorities-have-more-debt-92467, 
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439 Equal Justice Works, supra note 437. 
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they wish to obtain—education or homeownership. Third, minority graduates 
with higher levels of student loan debt often earn less than their non-minority 
counterparts do. Many African American college graduates are underem-
ployed, taking jobs that do not require college degrees.441 The Center for 
Economic and Policy Research conducted a study that found that “56 percent 
of Black college graduates were in an occupation that didn’t require a degree 
in 2013.”442 With lower incomes and higher debts, minority prospective 
homebuyers may be severely limited in how much they can borrow for a 
home mortgage and where they buy under the new Ability-to-Repay Rule. 
Similarly, the new rules would harm lenders because they potentially 
make the lending process costlier. Smaller banks, in particular, may not be 
technologically equipped to meet the demands of these new standards. Credi-
tors may have to “reconfigure policies and procedures, reprogram loan 
origination systems, and retrain personnel—thereby increasing the costs of 
underwriting loans.”443 If smaller banks do not have the resources to comply 
with the new requirements, then it is quite possible that many would be 
driven out of the market. On the other hand, those with the resources to 
comply with the standards will be skittish in extending credit.444 
The credit market is currently tight445 and might remain so for a while. 
The CFPB acknowledged that rules might need tweaking in the future and 
promised to keep an eye on the housing market and make adjustments if 
necessary.446 Furthermore, the rules do not prohibit lenders from offering 
non-qualified mortgages. Lenders have the autonomy to do so, but if they 
do, then the risk of liability that a consumer did not have the ability to repay 
the loan at origination is on the lender. 
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B. U.S. Department of Justice 
The DOJ is composed of multiple agencies or departments.447 The Civil 
Rights Division of the DOJ is authorized with enforcement duties concerning 
both the FHA448 and ECOA.449 The newly created Fair Lending Unit was 
created in response to the rampant discriminatory lending practices during the 
housing and foreclosure crisis.450 
The DOJ is given extensive authority to bring an action against lenders 
engaged in patterns or practices of unlawful discrimination.451 Also, the 
CFPB, HUD, FRB, OCC, Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), FDIC, and National Credit Unit Administration may also 
refer matters concerning patterns or practices of illegal discrimination452 to 
the DOJ.453 Between 2009 and 2011, the FTC and HUD referred 109 matters 
to the DOJ.454 
Referrals must be accepted for an enforcement action by the DOJ. For a 
referral to be accepted, all of the following criteria must exist. First, there 
must be a serious pattern related to “either financial or emotional harm to 
members of protected classes.”455 Second, court action is necessary to halt the 
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practice.456 Third, the “protected class members harmed by the practice can-
not be fully compensated without court action.”457 Fourth, damages “beyond 
out-of-pocket losses, are necessary to defer the lender (or others like it) from 
treating the cost of detection as a cost of doing business.”458 Fifth, “[t]he 
agency believes the practice to be sufficiently common in the lending indus-
try, or raises an important issue, so as to require its public disclosure as a 
deterrent to other lenders.”459 Fifty-five out of 109 of the referred matters 
from 2009 to 2011 concerned lending discrimination based on race or 
national origin.460 
In its 2010 Report to Congress, the Civil Rights Division reported that 
its main mission was “to address the wide range of discriminatory practices 
by lenders, brokers, and other players in the mortgage market that contributed 
to our nation’s housing crisis and economic meltdown.”461 Regulatory agen-
cies referred forty-nine matters of practice or patterns of discrimination to 
the DOJ and opened over sixty matters for investigation.462 The Fair Lending 
Unit brought its first major discriminatory lending enforcement action in 
2010 in United States. v. AIG Federal Savings Bank et al.463 
In United States v. AIG Federal Savings Bank et al., the Civil Rights Di-
vision simultaneously filed and settled an action alleging that AIG Federal 
Savings Bank (AIG) had violated the ECOA and FHA by charging higher 
fees associated with wholesale loans to African Americans from July 2003 
through May 2006.464 The complaint also alleged that AIG failed to super-
vise or monitor mortgage brokers’ fees.465 The settlement included provi-
sions requiring AIG to pay $2 million to borrowers who were harmed by the 
practice and “to have in place loan pricing policies, monitoring and em-
ployee training that ensure discrimination does not occur in the future.”466 
The year 2011 was a banner year for enforcement actions brought by the 
Civil Rights Division. The Fair Lending Unit filed eight lawsuits and reached 
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settlements totaling $350 million.467 The enforcement actions brought by the 
DOJ related to redlining, pricing discrimination, and fair lending discrimi-
nation.468 The DOJ settled its landmark discrimination case, the largest lend-
ing discrimination settlement in DOJ history, United States v. Countrywide 
Financial Corporation, for $335 million in December of 2011.469 The 
DOJ stated, “[n]o one case can rectify the multitude of unlawful practices in 
the housing and lending market that contributed to the nationwide housing 
and foreclosure crisis, but the Division’s fair lending work represents an im-
portant piece of the Department’s comprehensive efforts to address it.”470 
In 2012, the DOJ received a referral, filed, and settled a practice and 
pattern action against Wells Fargo, NA, alleging that Wells Fargo had steered 
African Americans and Latinos into subprime mortgages and charged higher 
fees and rates to these groups from 2004 to 2009.471 Wells Fargo agreed to 
pay $184.25 million in compensation to borrowers and to provide $50 
million in direct down payment assistance to communities hurt by the hous-
ing crisis and Wells Fargo’s discrimination.472 Additionally, two discrimi-
nation suits were filed and settled against SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.,473 and 
GFI Mortgage Bankers.474 SunTrust agreed to pay $21 million to their bor-
rower victims and was required to maintain specific policies on pricing 
and fair lending monitoring at least for three years. GFI was compelled “to 
pay $3.5 million in compensation to approximately 600 African-American 
and Hispanic GFI borrowers, the largest per-victim recovery in a Depart-
ment of Justice pricing case, and to pay the government the maximum 
$55,000 civil penalty allowed by the Fair Housing Act.”475 Under the consent 
order, the DOJ also required GFI to create policies similar to SunTrust’s.476 
The DOJ finished 2012 with nine open fair lending investigations and three 
authorized civil actions.477 
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C. Federal Reserve Board 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is “responsible 
for implementing various federal laws intended to protect and inform con-
sumers in credit and other financial service transactions, ensuring that con-
sumers receive comprehensive information and fair treatment in these 
transactions, and promoting economic development and community lend-
ing in historically underserved areas.”478 The FRB supervises member banks. 
For banks with assets greater than $10 billion, the FRB has supervisory 
authority to ensure compliance with the Fair Housing Act.479 However, the 
CFPB has supervisory authority to ensure compliance with the ECOA.480 
For banks with less than $10 billion in assets, the FRB has supervisory au-
thority for compliance to both the FHA and ECOA.481 
The FRB has the authority to remedy a fair lending violation on its own 
so long as the actions do not constitute a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion.482 To resolve these actions, the FRB may use “informal supervisory 
tools (such as memoranda of understanding between banks’ boards of direc-
tors and the Reserve Banks, or board resolutions) to ensure that violations 
are corrected. If necessary to protect consumers, however, the Board can 
bring public enforcement actions.”483 
D. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development 
The Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity within HUD is re-
sponsible for overseeing and enforcing federal laws and setting “national 
policies that make sure all Americans have equal access to the housing of 
their choice.”484 The laws enforced by HUD include the Fair Housing Act 
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, inter alia.485 
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HUD reviews housing discrimination complaints and determines whether 
it will issue a charge of discrimination.486 If HUD issues a charge of dis-
crimination, it will schedule an administrative action.487 At this point, either 
HUD or the defendant may opt to transfer the action to federal court.488 Once 
either party elects federal court, the DOJ will pursue the matter further.489 
X. ANOTHER REMEDY: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND SANCTIONS 
The typical remedy for violating the FHA and the ECOA is monetary 
penalties under civil law. However, the victims of the violation might be too 
numerous to obtain full satisfaction for the harm inflicted. Pursuant to the 
multi-million dollar settlements, mortgagors were entitled to receive their 
money mortgage payments up to the date of foreclosure.490 Depending on the 
settlement amount and number of claimants, a victim may not receive the 
full compensatory amount. Further, loss of equity is not taken into account. 
Moreover, the possibility of civil liability becomes a cost of doing business 
for lenders. However, those costs may have already been imposed on the vic-
tims or future consumers. 
On the other hand, criminal law enforcement and sanctions have three 
aims: (1) keep order and protect society;491 (2) deter certain types of be-
havior;492 and (3) exact retribution from the wrongdoer on behalf of its 
victim.493 For lending discrimination, this might serve as a great deterrent in 
the future, but the lending discrimination laws do not permit this remedy. 
For tax fraud, prosecutors consider the nature and seriousness of the fraud 
by taking into account numerous factors including, but not limited to: (1) the 
magnitude of the loss;494 (2) “[w]hether the loss stems from multiple tax 
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types”;495 (3) the length of time the loss persisted or number of taxpayers 
involved;496 (4) whether the conduct of the wrongdoer was intertwined “with 
other fraud or illegality”;497 and (5) the reasons for the fraud and degree of 
corruption.498 
It would not be too great of a leap to apply criminal sanctions to the 
mortgage lending arena. Criminal prosecution is already available in 
mortprocessgage fraud cases.499 Many mortgage fraud cases result in both 
restitution and prison sentences.500 
Lenders, brokers, or anyone who discriminates during the lending pro-
cess, especially to the scale as seen in the housing and foreclosure crisis, 
should be subjected to prison sentences. The aims of the criminal code will 
be accomplished. First, society will be protected by not being subject to 
lending discrimination. Second, criminal prosecution would send a very clear 
message to lenders (and others) that lending discrimination is reprehensi-
ble and will not be tolerated. Third, the victims would likewise be entitled 
to retribution. 
The vastitude of the losses experienced because of lending discrimina-
tion is immeasurable. This type of remedy would pack a greater punch than 
civil damages only. Criminal prosecution pierces the ivory tower and places 
the reality of the losses on the rightful party, the lending discrimination 
perpetrator. The threat of criminal prosecution incentivizes the would-be 
lending discriminator to curb the discriminatory behavior before it occurs. 
Thus, there would be minimal need to traverse the bureaucratic red tape that 
currently exists for fair mortgage lending. 
CONCLUSION 
Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez of the Department of Jus-
tice said:  
The promise of equal opportunity represents the foundation of the 
American dream—from the opportunity to learn, to the opportunity to 
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earn, to the opportunity to gain fair access to credit, to live where one 
chooses and move up the economic ladder—and homeownership has 
been its most basic building block.501  
However, minorities, who have historically been the victims of mortgage 
discrimination, are still battling for equal opportunities for fair mortgage 
lending and homeownership in the 21st Century. 
Although the laws that prohibit discrimination have been in place for 
over forty years, minorities—particularly Latinos and African Americans—
are waiting to receive fair access to credit and thence homeownership in 
areas of their choosing. Forty years into this unalleviated battle for a basic 
civil right, there exists ample evidence of patterns of racial inequality, which 
create a legacy of economic inequality. 
The mortgage lending process is multifaceted; it contains numerous 
stages and multiple factors are considered. Ideally, lenders look at a bor-
rower’s creditworthiness and other factors related to his or her ability to pay 
as opposed to skin color, ethnicity, or the area where the borrower lives. 
Lending discrimination affects all people, regardless of color or credit-
worthiness. None are safe from the fallout of lending discrimination. Banks, 
homeowners, their neighbors, cities, and ultimately, the national economy are 
all hurt by systemic defects in the lending process. Unfair lending practices 
lead to foreclosures, which, in turn, lead to blight and loss of tax revenues.502 
The U.S. government after many years of inaction has stepped up to 
address lending discrimination by filing suit against lenders who exhibited 
patterns of disparate treatment or whose policies have a disparate impact 
on a protected group. These lawsuits financially stung large banks that al-
legedly engaged in patterns or practices of discrimination. Hopefully, civil 
liability will serve as some deterrent to lenders in the future. However, in 
addition to civil liability, statutes should be amended to allow the Depart-
ment of Justice, or other federal regulatory agencies, to pursue criminal prose-
cution in the most egregious cases as well. Criminal liability will serve as the 
ultimate deterrent, the “teeth”, and will ensure that non-discriminatory be-
havior drives out discriminatory behavior in the consumer credit market.503 
Likewise, the new servicing rules should provide sufficient and uniform 
guidelines for lenders. However, the concern with these rules is that gaps 
in homeownership rates will grow even wider. Missing from the equation in 
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this lending discrimination reformation step by the CFPB (and other regu-
latory agencies charged with consumer protection) is the fact that some mi-
norities start with other economic inequalities due to lack of equal access 
to education or employment.504 Accordingly, servicing guidelines should 
restrict lending discrimination by providing a mechanism for enforcement, 
but also take into account that the goal of fair access to affordable housing 
for all Americans regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, familial 
status, religion, or disability. This requires an acknowledgement of the persis-
tent financial inequalities that exist separate from the housing market. 
Additionally, more effort must be taken to educate the public on credit, 
its products, and what constitutes lending discrimination. There are many 
who do not understand that they are in a situation of mortgage discrimination 
until things go terribly wrong, such as delinquencies or foreclosures. Because 
discrimination may occur at any stage of the lending process, not just during 
the end stage, borrowers need to be more aware so that prompt action may 
take place. 
It is for the betterment of society to eradicate all forms of discrimina-
tion, whether it is related to lending or otherwise. Hopefully, lending refor-
mation efforts will make the lending process color blind, help heal the real 
estate market by opening (or re-opening) the door of homeownership to the 
segments of the population currently locked out, and bridge gaps in wealth 
accumulation among all Americans. The uphill struggle by regulators and 
agencies must carry on until minority homeownership rates more closely 
mirror those of non-minorities. It is time to break the shackles of discrimi-
nation and allow qualified borrowers to receive non-discriminatory terms in 
all credit transactions, including mortgage financing. Only then can we can 
truly label the American Dream, the American Dream. 
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